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Abstract
A secure product entitlement system allows one party, such as a pay-TV operator, to
broadcast the same collection of information to several receiving parties while only allow-
ing a certain subset of the receiving parties to access the information. This system must
still be secure in the scenario where all receiving parties who are not allowed access to the
information, pool their resources in an attempt to gain access to the information. Such a
product entitlement system must also be bandwidth eﬃcient since it can be deployed in
networks where bandwidth is at a premium.
The foundations of modern encryption techniques is reviewed and a survey of existing
techniques, used to secure content in broadcast environments, is studied. From this
collection of techniques two were identiﬁed as bandwidth eﬃcient and are discussed in
more detail before being implemented.
An attempt is then made to design a new secure bandwidth eﬃcient encryption scheme
for protecting content in a broadcast environment. Several iterations of the design is de-
tailed, including the security ﬂaw which makes each design insecure. The ﬁnal design was
implemented and compared in several metrics to the two previously selected bandwidth
eﬃcient schemes. A framework to test the correctness of the schemes over a network is
also designed and implemented.
Possible future avenues of research are identiﬁed with regards to creating a secure
broadcast encryption scheme and improving the software solution in which to use such a
scheme.
ii
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Uittreksel
'n Veilige produk-aanspraak-stelsel stel een party, soos byvoorbeeld 'n betaal-TV-operateur,
in staat om dieselfde versameling inligting na verskeie partye uit te saai, terwyl slegs 'n
bepaalde deelversameling van die ontvangende partye toegelaat sal word om toegang tot
die inligting te bekom. Hierdie stelsel moet steeds die inligting beskerm in die geval waar
al die ontvangende partye wat toegang geweier word, hul hulpbronne saamsmee in 'n
poging om toegang te verkry. So 'n produk-aanspraak-stelsel moet ook bandwydte doel-
treﬀend benut, aangesien dit gebruik kan word in netwerke waar bandwydte baie duur
is.
Die fondamente van die moderne enkripsietegnieke word hersien. 'n Opname van
bestaande tegnieke wat gebruik word om inligting te beskerm in 'n uitsaai omgewing
word bestudeer. Uit hierdie versameling tegnieke word twee geïdentiﬁseer as tegnieke wat
bandwydte doeltreﬀend benut en word meer volledig bespreek voordat dit geïmplementeer
word.
'n Poging word dan aangewend om 'n nuwe veilige bandwydte doeltreﬀende enkripsie-
tegniek te ontwerp vir die beskerming van inligting wat uitgesaai word. Verskeie iterasies
van die ontwerp word uiteengesit, met 'n bespreking van die sekuriteitsfout wat elke
ontwerp onveilig maak. Die ﬁnale ontwerp is geïmplementeer en aan die hand van verskeie
maatstawwe vergelyk met die twee bandwydte doeltreﬀende tegnieke, wat voorheen gekies
is. 'n Raamwerk om die korrektheid van die tegnieke oor 'n netwerk te toets, is ook ont-
werp en geïmplementeer.
Moontlike toekomstige rigtings van navorsing word geïdentiﬁseer met betrekking tot
die skep van 'n veilige uitsaai enkripsietegniek en die verbetering van die sagteware-
oplossing wat so 'n tegniek gebruik.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Pay-TV Networks and Security
Pay-TV networks are migrating their viewers from analogue to digital transmission sys-
tems [33]. This enables them to lower the amount of bandwidth used to transmit the
content to their viewers, as this is a scarce resource in terrestrial and satellite broadcast
TV networks. The cornerstone of any pay-TV network is product entitlement - the ability
to only allow a certain subset of their viewers to access certain broadcasts.
A typical product entitlement scenario is depicted in Figure 1.1. Alice has some
information, for example a digital representation of a ﬁlm, that she would like to share
with some of her friends who are all called Bob. She wants to transfer her information
in such a way that only the Bobs coloured blue have access to it. To complicate matters
further, the colour of each Bob can change over time. A product entitlement system aims
to help Alice solve this problem. An easy solution to the problem would be to only send
the information to the Bobs who are allowed to access it, but in satellite and terrestrial
broadcasting environments the signal can be received across a large area and this approach
might not be feasible.
The ﬁeld of cryptography was founded to aid parties in transferring information in
such a way that only the correct receiving party can access the information. The classical
cryptographic situation is shown in Figure 1.2 and has Alice wanting to send her infor-
Alice
Bob Bob Bob Bob Bob Bob
Figure 1.1: A typical product entitlement situation
1
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
channelAlice Bob
Eve
Figure 1.2: Classic cryptography situation
mation or message to only one Bob. The information is sent through some channel over
which neither Alice nor Bob has complete control. Cryptography helps Alice and Bob to
transfer her information in such a way that
1. Alice can be sure that only Bob can read the message, and
2. Bob can be sure that Alice is the person who sent the message.
These properties are necessary as the channel through which Alice and Bob communicate
might be under the full control of a malicious third-party called Eve. It is possible for Eve
to record any messages that Alice sends to Bob, perhaps stop those messages and send her
own specially crafted messages to Bob in an attempt to make him reveal the information
that Eve wants or to make him do something diﬀerent from what Alice intended him to
do.
Alice
Bob Bob Bob Bob Bob Eve
Eve Eve
Figure 1.3: Product entitlement security concerns
It would seem that cryptography would present Alice with a solution to her problem
of product entitlement. When applying cryptography to the product entitlement problem
over broadcast networks the situation shown in Figure 1.2 changes to the one in Figure 1.3.
From this ﬁgure we can see there are now new problems to contend with: not only is the
information sent to Bob being listened to by Eve but some of the Bobs that Alice is sending
her message to might actually be Eve as well. In the product entitlement situation there
is no Eve that controls the channel through which Alice sends her information since each
Bob-Eve can use the information they receive in any way they wish. The dynamic nature
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of the subset of Bobs who are allowed to access the messages that Alice is sending means
that at some stage a Bob-Eve might be in the authorised set while other times they might
not, as is shown in Figure 1.3. In recent years the subsets used in product entitlement
systems have become more dynamic and it is possible that the subset can change as
frequently as every two hours as ﬁlms are shown back to back on certain pay per view
ﬁlm channels [2]. Thus for Alice to ensure that only the correct subset of Bobs can access
her message the product entitlement system used must be secure against this situation.
For pay-TV networks a product entitlement system would allow the pay-TV provider
to present their subscribers with diﬀerent types of subscriptions. One type of subscription
might give a viewer access to only the sports channels while a more expensive subscription
contains access to both the sports and ﬁlm channels. In a pay-TV network using satellite
or terrestrial broadcast networks a bandwidth eﬃcient product entitlement system has
to be used as the amount of bandwidth available to transfer entitlement messages to
a viewer's device is severely constrained [21]. This system also needs to be secure so
that unauthorized viewers cannot access broadcasts they are not entitled to. In recent
years the attacks on pay-TV networks have escalated to such a degree that once thought
secure methods, such as smart cards, are not able to prevent unauthorized viewers from
accessing content [23, 26]. Thus the need exists to create secure product entitlement
systems without the use of secure hardware. This is also compounded by the fact that
pay-TV networks are moving into the mobile market where the use of secure hardware
might not be possible [25, 28].
A ﬁeld of study in cryptography that lends itself well to the product entitlement area is
broadcast encryption. This kind of encryption deals with the problem of securing content
in such a manner that only a certain subset of users can access the content which is
set by some central authority known as the broadcasting centre. Broadcast encryption
schemes are designed to be secure against collusion attacks. A collusion attack is one
where several users who are not entitled to access the content, pool their information in
an attempt to break the security on the content. The collusion resistance property of
broadcast encryption schemes aim to solve the problem shown in Figure 1.3, but with the
added constraint that all the Bob-Eves now work together.
There are several considerations that go into the design choices behind a broadcast
encryption scheme. These include the bandwidth used by the scheme, the storage space
required at each receiver and the time needed to compute a key. In the context of pay-TV
networks bandwidth eﬃciency is the most important consideration as bandwidth for the
widely used terrestrial and satellite broadcast networks is expensive and scarce. While
several bandwidth eﬃcient schemes have been proposed in the literature the most eﬃcient
schemes still require two keys to be broadcast [4, 12]. It is our belief that this can be
brought down to one key.
The theoretical analysis of a designed broadcast encryption scheme design will give
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Figure 1.4: Set Top Box
insight into the bandwidth requirements, but practical measurements must be taken to
validate the theoretical analysis. To this end a framework is needed that can test the
broadcast encryption schemes across all the input variables for performance as well for
correctness. This framework must report the measurements of all the important metrics
for broadcast encryption schemes, bandwidth eﬃciency being the most important.
Finally, a broadcast encryption scheme on its own does not constitute a product enti-
tlement scheme. Pay-TV networks use set-top boxes to facilitate a viewer in decrypting
the content that they broadcast. A simpliﬁed view of a set-top box is shown in Figure 1.4.
The key information and encrypted video is read from the information broadcasted in the
network. The key information is sent to a conditional access (CA) client. The CA client
can be implemented on small computational devices such as smart cards. This allows
the CA client to be changed if for instance the set-top box is reassigned to a new viewer.
The CA client uses the key information to calculate an encryption key that it sends to
the system-on-chip. The system-on-chip decrypts and renders the video content before
sending it to the display attached to the set-top box. Any designed broadcast encryption
schemes will be wholly contained in the CA client. To test the proper network function-
ality of the scheme a framework is needed that will emulate the system on chip as well
as the broadcast centre. Thus the framework has to facilitate the transfer of the secured
data across the network as well as provide an interface from which the entitled set can
be changed. This framework must also allow the operator to use a variety of diﬀerent
broadcast encryption schemes as no one scheme is perfect for every situation.
1.2 Goals
The goals of this study are thus deﬁned as:
1. The design of a new bandwidth eﬃcient and secure broadcast encryption scheme.
2. Evaluate the newly designed scheme and compare it to examples found in the liter-
ature.
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3. Develop a framework for testing and measuring the performance of broadcast en-
cryption schemes.
4. The development of a framework which can be used to turn a broadcast encryption
scheme into a product entitlement system which tests the correctness of a broadcast
encryption scheme over a network.
1.3 Contributions
This thesis details the design process of a bandwidth eﬃcient broadcast encryption scheme
as well as two supporting frameworks. Therefore the contributions made by this study
are:
1. A performance testing framework for broadcast encryption schemes.
2. An evaluation of three broadcast encryption schemes using the testing framework.
3. A framework to turn a broadcast encryption scheme into a product entitlement
system which can also test the correctness of broadcast encryption schemes over a
network.
4. A more eﬃcient method of calculating the values used by a scheme found in the
literature, signiﬁcantly improving the performance and making it a viable choice for
practical use.
1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the required concepts and results in the ﬁeld of cryp-
tography to understand and design a secure broadcast encryption scheme. The chapter
begins with an explanation of perfect secrecy and motivates that it is not a practical
solution to implement. In order to understand the limitations of practical cryptographic
implementations three ways in which security for an implementation is proved is dis-
cussed. This is accompanied by a discussion of the diﬀerent kinds of abilities that an
attacker might have. These abilities are divided into two categories: The attack model
deﬁnes how the attacker can manipulate and extract information from the cryptographic
implementation itself while the security level deﬁnes the ways in which the attacker can
interact on a functional level with the implementation.
The cryptographic background discussion is split into two parts, namely symmetric
and asymmetric encryption. Each of these parts is discussed individually detailing the
building blocks for each and presenting some practical implementations. The chapter
then focuses more on the ﬁeld of broadcast encryption and discusses several schemes
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found in the literature. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on the way product
entitlement systems are implemented on set top boxes used by pay-TV networks.
In Chapter 3 the design and security analysis of several broadcast encryption schemes
are given. The ﬁrst two schemes presented have been proposed in the literature and will
serve as a benchmark against any schemes proposed in this thesis. The chapter then
continues by presenting four diﬀerent designs for broadcast encryption schemes as well
as a cryptanalysis for each of these to show how they are insecure. Each new scheme
proposed attempts to rectify the security ﬂaw found in the previous design.
The need for a performance testing framework and a framework for turning a broad-
cast encryption scheme into a product entitlement system has already been discussed.
Chapter 4 describes the software design and implementation of two such frameworks.
The discussion starts by listing the requirements for each of these two frameworks and
then gives a detailed overview of the components used for the product entitlement frame-
work and how the components interact. These diﬀerent components are then presented
in more detail. Finally, the performance testing framework is presented together with
a motivation for the parameters that were selected for testing as well as the procedure
followed to verify that the data has been decrypted correctly. After the conceptual de-
sign of the frameworks is given, some practical issues that were encountered during the
implementation of the frameworks are discussed.
Due to the diﬀerent assumptions that security of the implemented schemes are based
on, Chapter 5 initially discusses a way of comparing the diﬀerent levels of security given
by the assumptions. Next the results measured by the performance testing framework are
presented and the results of our newly designed broadcast encryption scheme is compared
against those of two schemes found in the literature. The chapter ﬁnally discusses the net-
work testing of the product entitlement system and discusses the limitations encountered
during the testing procedure.
Chapter 6 is a conclusion to this thesis and makes recommendations for future work
as well as discussing the achievement of the goals set out for this thesis.
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Cryptographic Background
2.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to lay the necessary groundwork that is needed to develop a broadcast
encryption scheme that is secure against collusion attacks. First an overview of the cryp-
tographic primitives will be given. These concepts are required in order to understand
the current research in broadcast encryption (covered in Section 2.6). This is followed
by a detailed discussion of block and stream ciphers in Section 2.3 which is needed to
understand Section 2.4 where two white-box block cipher implementations are discussed
together with other similar results in related cryptographic ﬁelds. In the next section,
2.5, some number theory fundamentals and theorems are shown together with the asym-
metric cryptographic schemes that can be constructed using these theorems. The chapter
then proceeds to discuss some broadcast encryption schemes in Section 2.6 found in the
literature and which might be candidates to implement in a product entitlement system.
Finally, in Section 2.7 the functioning of a set top box is discussed as this is the hardware
on which a product entitlement system will run when used in a satellite or terrestrial
broadcasting environment.
2.2 Security Notions
Cryptography aims to provide information security to its users. In this section we will
discuss the various deﬁnitions and models which are used in deﬁning the security for a
speciﬁc cryptographic implementation.
2.2.1 Cryptographic Schemes
Before we can proceed with the security deﬁnitions it must ﬁrst be deﬁned what constitutes
a cryptographic scheme. As mentioned there are two main types of encryption schemes:
symmetric and asymmetric.
7
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A symmetric encryption scheme, also called a private key scheme, is an encryption
scheme where the same key is used for the encryption and decryption of a message. For
security of these schemes to hold the key must be transmitted over a secure channel.
Letting {0, 1}∗ indicate a string of 1's and 0's of arbitrary length, a symmetric encryp-
tion scheme can be formally deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 1. Symmetric Encryption Scheme
A symmetric encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms
Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) such that
1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter λ and
outputs a randomized key k. It is assumed without loss of generality that the length
of any key k← Gen (λ) satisﬁes ‖k‖ ≥ λ.
2. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a key k and a plaintext message m ∈
{0, 1}∗, and outputs a ciphertext c. Since Enc may be randomized we write this as
c← Enck(m).
3. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a key k and a ciphertext c, and outputs
a message m. We assume that Dec is deterministic, thus m = Deck(c).
It is required that for every λ, every k output by Gen (λ), and every m ∈ {0, 1}∗, it holds
that Deck [Enck (m)] = m. This is known as the correctness property of the scheme.
An inherent problem of symmetric encryption schemes is that the key has to be ex-
changed over a secure channel. This is not always possible and the ﬁeld of asymmetric
cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, addresses this problem. Public key
cryptography allows two parties, Alice and Bob, to exchange messages over an unsecured
channel without compromising the security of subsequent transmissions. An asymmetric
scheme has two keys - the public key, used for the encryption step, and the private key,
used for the decryption step. Two parties who wish to communicate over an unsecured
channel exchange their public keys over this channel. Now Alice can encrypt messages so
that only Bob can decrypt them and vice versa. Formally this can be deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 2. Asymmetric Encryption Scheme
An asymmetric encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithms Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) such that:
1. The key generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter λ and
outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk). We refer to the ﬁrst of these as the public key and
the second as the private key. We assume for convenience that pk and sk each have
length of at least λ and that λ can be determined from pk and sk.
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Figure 2.1: Hybrid encryption between Alice an Bob
2. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a public key pk and a message m from
some underlying plaintext space (that may depend on pk). It outputs a ciphertext
c and we write this as c← Encpk(m).
3. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext c.
and outputs a message m or a special symbol ⊥ denoting failure. We assume that
without loss of generality that Dec is deterministic and write this as m = Decsk(c).
It is required that Decsk [Encpk (m)] = m except with negligible probability over (pk, sk)
output by Gen (λ) and any randomness used by Enc.
In some asymmetric schemes the choice of public key directly inﬂuences which messages
can be encrypted with the scheme, for example if the public key is a positive integer and
the scheme can only encrypt positive integers smaller than the public key.
Hybrid encryption
Public key cryptography did not replace the use of symmetric encryption ciphers. Imple-
mentations of public key schemes require the multiplication of very large integers which
is much slower than the simple substitutions and exclusive-or operations employed by
symmetric ciphers. Asymmetric schemes normally also suﬀer from ciphertext expansion
where the ciphertext is several times larger than the message that was encrypted.
Hybrid encryption is a way of using symmetric and asymmetric schemes together to
gain the beneﬁts of both types of schemes. When using hybrid encryption Alice would
encrypt a key k using a public key scheme and Bob's public key pk. She would then
encrypt her message m using a symmetric cipher with the key k. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.1. Now only the symmetric key suﬀers from ciphertext expansion while the
message, that can be much larger, does not and they do not need to transmit over a
secure channel to have security.
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2.2.2 Perfect Secrecy and Kerckhoﬀ's principle
Perfect secrecy is achievable, as has been proved by Shannon in his seminal paper [35].
The one-time pad, also known as Vernam's Cipher, is such a perfectly secure scheme. Per-
fect secrecy refers to a cryptographic scheme that is secure against an unbounded attacker
while most cryptographic schemes in use today only oﬀer security against polynomially
bounded attackers. The one-time pad, however, is of limited practical use. It is a sym-
metric cipher where the ciphertext is found by calculating the exclusive-or of the key and
message. This requires that the size of the key be equal to the size of the message. For
the one-time pad to stay perfectly secure, no key may be re-used twice, other than by
random chance. This means that the secure channel that has to be established each time
to transfer the key could rather have been used to transmit the message itself, making
the one-time pad impractical.
Another important idea in modern cryptography is Kerckhoﬀ's principle which states [20]:
The cipher method must not be required to be secret, and it must be able
to fall into the hands of the enemy without inconvenience.
Another way of saying this is that the only part of the cryptographic scheme that has to
be kept secret to ensure that it stays secure, is the key used. One simple reason is that
if a key falls into the hands of an enemy it takes a minimal amount of eﬀort to create a
diﬀerent key or even expand the key size, while developing and deploying a whole new
cryptographic system is costly. It is also much easier to keep a key secret as it is much
smaller than an entire cryptographic system. Releasing the details of a cryptographic
scheme also allows a broader audience to inspect the cipher for weaknesses. Additionally,
if the encryption method is known, then independent veriﬁcation of any security claims
of the scheme used can be made.
Since perfectly secure cryptographic schemes are not of practical use, what kind of
security can a practical scheme oﬀer? In modern cryptography the assumption is made
that all adversaries are polynomially bounded. Such an adversary only has storage space
and computation time available to it that can be described by some polynomial. Using
this assumption the bounds of the security oﬀered by the cryptographic scheme can be
explicitly stated.
Security for schemes is proven in one of three ways: explicitly, with mathematical
assumptions and by peer review.
2.2.3 Security Proofs
While the one-time pad has an explicit proof of security, this may not be possible for all
schemes. Instead, the proof of security is shown to rely on certain assumptions which
are widely believed to be true, such as one-way functions exist or no polynomial time
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 11
factoring algorithm exists. Basing the security claims on such well-known problems
allows us to immediately know that when such a problem is solved, the scheme becomes
insecure. Such a proof is constructed by mathematically proving the security to some
negligible probability in the security parameter of the scheme.
Other systems rely on extensive peer-review to claim their security. For instance, the
Data Encryption Standard (DES) developed in 1977 [37] has no proof of security, but in
all the years of scrutiny since its conception, the best known practical attack is a brute
force search over the key space. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) competition
was held to ﬁnd a successor to DES as the size of its keys have become too small to be
considered secure on fast modern hardware. For this competition anyone could submit
a candidate cipher which would then be publicly reviewed, including review by other
contestants.
In order to understand the security oﬀered by cryptographic schemes it must ﬁrst be
deﬁned what capabilities the attacker has. An adversary's capabilities is composed of
both an attack and a security model.
2.2.4 Attack Models
An attack model for an adversary details how an attacker can manipulate and extract in-
formation from the cryptographic implementation itself. Attack models for cryptographic
implementations can be grouped into three groups [11]:
1. Black-box: This is the classical model against which cryptographic implementations
are secured. The assumption is this case is that the attacker only has full access
to information transmitted over a channel between parties and oracle access to
encryption and decryption routines.
2. Grey-box : The attacker now has access to data generated by the physical imple-
mentation of the cryptographic routine. This includes physical attributes such as
power consumption and timing data.
3. White-box : In this model it is assumed the attacker has full control over the cryp-
tographic implementation as it executes. Thus the attacker can read the values of
intermediate calculations in the implementation as well as modify these values at
will.
It should be noted that an attacker operating in the white-box attack model also implicitly
operates in the grey and black-box models. Therefore an implementation that is secure in
the white-box model is also secure in both the black and grey-box models. Any software
implementation of a cryptographic algorithm should be designed within the white-box
attack model since they can be executed by an attacker on a host over which they have
full control.
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Any cryptographic implementation is only secure as long as the key used is not known
to the attacker. A cipher secure in the black-box attack model ensures that the attacker
cannot learn the key by manipulating the inputs and outputs to the implementation.
However, once an attacker gains white-box attack model privileges against a black-box
implementation they can simply retrieve the key from the memory of the implementation
they are attacking. Thus most implementations secure against the black-box attack model
are not at all secure against the white-box attack model.
2.2.5 Security Models
The security model deﬁnes the ways in which the attacker can interact on a functional
level with the implementation. On a functional level refers to which parts of the entire
scheme the attacker has access to as it is possible for an attacker to only have access
to the encryption routines and not necessarily the decryption ones. If an attacker can
receive the decryptions of ciphertexts then we say the attacker has oracle access to the
decryption routine. Note that when requesting a decryption and receiving the plaintext
from their oracle the attacker does not see the key used, only the result of his inputs.
A useful way of expressing the security model of a scheme is in terms of how indis-
tinguishable the ciphertexts it produces are. The reasoning is that if an attacker cannot
even distinguish between the ciphertexts or the ciphertext and a random string then he
can learn no information about the plaintext. There are three main security models used
for cryptographic schemes [20]:
1. Security in the presence of an eavesdropper,
2. Security against adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (CPA secure), and
3. Security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA secure).
We will now discuss each of these security models in short. The deﬁnitions given are only
for symmetric encryption schemes as the asymmetric scheme deﬁnitions are analogously
deﬁned but with the attacker given the public key of the scheme. The security deﬁnitions
that follows assume that a scheme is broken if an adversary can do signiﬁcantly better
than just trying to guess the answer.
2.2.5.1 Security in the Presence of an Eavesdropper
The ﬁrst security model has the weakest type of attacker, one who can only see ciphertexts
produced by the scheme.
Deﬁnition 3. The eavesdropping indistinguishability experiment PrivKeavA,Π(λ):
1. A key k is generated by running Gen(λ).
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2. The adversary A is given input λ and outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 of the same
length.
3. A random bit b← {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c← Enck(mb) is computed
and given to A.
4. A outputs a bit b′.
5. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
This deﬁnition can be extended to allow the attacker to query the scheme with a two
vectors of messages. One of these vectors is chosen and the messages are encrypted one
at a time and returned as another vector. The attacker now has to identify which vector
of messages was encrypted by the experiment. Formally security against an eavesdropper
can be deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 4. Security in the presence of an eavesdropper
An encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure in the presence of an eavesdropper
if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function
negl such that
Pr
[
PrivKeavA,Π(λ) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(λ). (2.1)
2.2.5.2 Security against Adaptive Chosen Plaintext Attacks
In this security model the attacker gains oracle access to the encryption routine.
Deﬁnition 5. The CCA indistinguishability experiment PrivKcpaA,Π(λ):
1. A key k is generated by running Gen(λ).
2. The adversary A is given input λ and oracle access to Enck(·).
3. A outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 of the same length.
4. A random bit b← {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c← Enck(mb) is computed
and given to A.
5. The adversary A continues to have oracle access to Enck(·).
6. A outputs a bit b′.
7. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
This deﬁnition also has a non-adaptive variant in which step 5 is not present which
leads to a less secure scheme. Security against adaptive chosen plaintext attacks is then
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deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 6. Security against adaptive chosen plaintext attacks
An encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure against adaptive chosen plaintext
attacks if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible
function negl such that
Pr
[
PrivKcpaA,Π(λ) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(λ). (2.2)
2.2.5.3 Security against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks
In this security model the attacker has the same capabilities as in an adaptive chosen
plaintext attack as well as oracle access to the decryption routine of the scheme. We ﬁrst
deﬁne the security experiment.
Deﬁnition 7. The CCA indistinguishability experiment PrivKccaA,Π(λ):
1. A key k is generated by running Gen(λ).
2. The adversary A is given input λ and oracle access to Enck(·) and Deck(·).
3. A outputs a pair of messages m0,m1 of the same length.
4. A random bit b← {0, 1} is chosen, and then a ciphertext c← Enck(mb) is computed
and given to A.
5. The adversary A continues to have oracle access to Enck(·) and Deck(·) , but is not
allowed to query the latter on c.
6. A outputs a bit b′.
7. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if b′ = b, and 0 otherwise.
This deﬁnition also has a non-adaptive variant in which step 5 is not present which
leads to a less secure scheme. Security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks is then
deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 8. Security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks
An encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible
function negl such that
Pr
[
PrivKccaA,Π(λ) = 1
] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(λ). (2.3)
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2.3 Block and Stream Ciphers
The white-box implementations of two block ciphers is discussed in the next section, but
an overview of block and stream ciphers is given here.
Symmetric encryption schemes can be classiﬁed as one of two ciphers: stream or block.
Stream ciphers make use of the stream of bits generated by a pseudorandom generator
and can encrypt messages of length equal to the expansion factor of the generator. Block
ciphers are designed with a speciﬁc block size and can only encrypt messages of that block
size. Block ciphers can be extended to encrypt messages of arbitrary length by running
them in diﬀerent modes of operation, which is discussed later. We ﬁrst introduce some
key concepts in understanding the security behind block and stream ciphers.
2.3.1 One-way Functions and Pseudorandomness
Several cryptographic schemes use one-way functions as a basis of their claims to security.
Informally, if a one-way function f and some input x is known, then f(x) is eﬃciently
computable, but if only f(x) and f is known, then x cannot be eﬃciently calculated.
Letting {0, 1}λ indicate a string of 1's and 0's of length λ, the inverting experiment
InvertA,f (λ) with attacker A against the function f is deﬁned [20]:
Deﬁnition 9. The inverting experiment InvertA,f (λ)
1. Choose input x← {0, 1}λ. Compute y = f(x).
2. A is given λ and y as input and outputs x′.
3. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if f(x′) = y, and 0 otherwise.
A one-way function is formally deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 10. One-way Function
A function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ is one-way if the following two conditions hold:
1. (Easy to compute) There exists a polynomial time algorithm Mf for computing f ;
that is
Mf (x) = f(x);∀x ∈ {0, 1}∗. (2.4)
2. (Hard to invert) For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists
some negligible function negl such that the probability
Pr [InvertA,f (λ) = 1] ≤ negl (λ) (2.5)
where λ is the security parameter.
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A concept similar to one-way functions are trap-door permutations. These permuta-
tions are bijective functions that behave as a one-way function so long as a secret trap-door
value t stays secret. As soon as t is known, the permutation can be eﬃciently inverted.
One of the simplest modern cryptographic schemes is a stream cipher that uses a
pseudorandom generator for security. Informally a pseudorandom generator outputs a
deterministic string such that any adversary who runs in polynomial time is unable to
tell the diﬀerence between the generated string and a string chosen uniformly at random.
Such an adversary is known as a distinguisher, is denoted by the symbol D and outputs 1
when they think they have been given a truly random string. A pseudorandom generator
is thus deﬁned as follows [20]:
Deﬁnition 11. Pseudorandom Generator
Let ` (·) be a polynomial and let G be a deterministic polynomial time algorithm such
that for any input s ∈ {0, 1}λ, algorithm G outputs a string of length ` (λ). We say that
G is a pseudorandom generator if the following two conditions hold:
1. (Expansion) For every λ it holds that ` (λ) > λ and
2. (Pseudorandomness) for all polynomial-time distinguishers D with r ← {0, 1}`(λ)
and s← {0, 1}λ , there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr {[D (r) = 1] ∧ [D (G (s)) = 0]} ≤ negl (λ) (2.6)
where the s is known as the seed of the pseudorandom generator. The function ` (·) is
called the expansion factor of G.
With some of the basic cryptographic primitives having been presented we can now
continue to discuss a few constructions of symmetric cryptographic schemes.
2.3.2 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers operate on the same principle as the one-time pad. Take a string of bits and
ﬁnd the exclusive or of it with the message. The one-time pad uses a truly random string
whereas stream ciphers use a pseudorandom string. What follows is a formal construction
of a stream cipher by using a pseudorandom generator [20].
Deﬁnition 12. Stream Cipher
Let G be a pseudorandom generator with expansion factor `. Deﬁne a symmetric
encryption scheme for messages of length ` as follows:
 Gen: On input λ, choose k← {0, 1}λ uniformly at random and output it as the key.
 Enc: on input a key k ∈ {0, 1}λ and a message m ∈ {0, 1}`, output the ciphertext
c = G(k)⊕m.
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 Dec: on input a key k ∈ {0, 1}λ and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}`, output the ciphertext
m = G(k)⊕ c.
It can be proven that the above construction has indistinguishable encryptions in the
presence of an eavesdropper under the assumption that G is a pseudorandom generator.
However, this construction does not provide indistinguishable multiple encryptions in
the presence of an eavesdropper. This can easily be seen from the fact that the above
construction is deterministic. Also, using the construction as described above violates the
principle of the one-time pad that no random stream may be reused. A workaround to
this is to have the Enc algorithm output a random initializing vector IV together with the
ciphertext. The pseudorandom generator then has to be adapted to take both the key
and IV as input to produce a pseudorandom stream.
2.3.3 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is an eﬃcient keyed permutation, deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 13. Eﬃcient Keyed Permutation
A function F : {0, 1}λ × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}` is an eﬃcient keyed permutation if the
following two properties hold
1. The function F (k, x), referred to as Fk(x), is a bijection over {0, 1}` for all k ∈
{0, 1}λ.
2. Fk and F
−1
k are both eﬃciently calculable given k.
In the context of a block cipher, we refer to ` as the block length and λ as the key length.
The above deﬁnition of a block cipher contains no notion of security. The function
F (k, x) = x;∀k ∈ {0, 1}λ, x ∈ {0, 1}` is an eﬃcient keyed permutation, but is not secure
in any way. When deﬁning security for pseudorandom permutations the concept of a
distinguisher is used as well. When applied to a pseudorandom generator the aim of the
distinguisher is to distinguish between a random string and a pseudorandom one. For
pseudorandom permutations the distinguisher must distinguish between the pseudoran-
dom permutation and a truly random permutation. It is required that all secure block
ciphers be strong pseudorandom permutations, deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 14. Strong Pseudorandom Permutation
Let F : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be an eﬃcient, keyed permutation. We say that F is
a strong pseudorandom permutation if, for all probabilistic polynomial time distinguishers
D, there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr
{[
DFk(·),F−1k (·)(λ) = 0
]
∧
[
Df(·),f−1(·)(λ) = 1
]}
≤ negl(λ), (2.7)
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where k ← {0, 1}λ is chosen uniformly at random and f is chosen uniformly at random
from the set of all permutations on λ-bit strings.
Thus an attacker must not be able to distinguish between a random permutation and
a pseudorandom one, even when given access to both permutations and their inverses.
Modes of Operation for Block Ciphers
Block ciphers are designed to work for a speciﬁc block length, but messages will not
necessarily ﬁt in the allocated block size. To overcome this limitation there are four
commonly used modes of operation in which a block cipher with a block size of ` can run
to increase the size of the messages it can encrypt. For all modes the message m is split
into several blocks m = m1‖m2‖ . . . ‖mx, with each mi of length `. Here x‖y indicates
the concatenation of the strings x and y. A padding scheme is required if the message
length is not an integer multiple of the block size. A simple padding scheme would be to
add zeroes to the left of the message until its length is an integer multiple of the block
size. The four modes are [20]
1. Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode (Figure 2.2). Each of the mi plaintext message
blocks are separately passed through the block cipher to produce the ciphertext
c = Fk(m1)‖ . . . ‖Fk(mx). This mode of operation is highly insecure as it doesn't
even have indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, because
it is possible that the same block of plaintext can be repeated in the message which
would encrypt to the same block of ciphertext which helps an adversary distinguish
ciphertexts.
2. Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode (Figure 2.3). Here a random initializing vector
IV of length ` is chosen. This vector is then XORed with the ﬁrst block of the message
before being passed through the block cipher. Each successive block of the plaintext
is then ﬁrst XORed with the ciphertext of the previous block before being passed
through the pseudorandom permutation. More concisely, let c0 = IV← {0, 1}` and
then for all i ≤ x, let ci = Fk(ci−1⊕mi). This mode can be proven to be CPA-secure
if F is a pseudorandom permutation.
3. Output Feedback (OFB) mode (Figure 2.4). This mode creates a stream cipher
by using a block cipher as a pseudorandom generator. This is achieved by taking a
random IV of length ` and passing it through the block cipher. This is the ﬁrst block
of the random stream. Each block after that is then found by passing the previous
block of the random stream through the block cipher. Encryption is achieved by
XORing the corresponding message and random blocks. More concisely, let c0 =
r0 = IV ← {0, 1}` and then for 1 ≤ i ≤ x let ri = Fk(ri−1) and ci = mi ⊕ ri. This
mode is also CPA-secure if F is a pseudorandom permutation.
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Figure 2.2: Electronic Code Book mode
m2
⊕
FkFk Fk
⊕ ⊕
m1 m3
IV
c1 c2 c3c0
Figure 2.3: Cipher Block Chaining mode
m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ m3 ⊕
Fk Fk FkIV
c1 c2 c3c0
Figure 2.4: Output Feedback mode
m1 ⊕ m2 ⊕ m3 ⊕
Fk Fk Fk
ctr + 1 ctr + 2 ctr + 3ctr
c1 c2 c3c0
Figure 2.5: Counter mode
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4. Counter (CTR) mode (Figure 2.5). This mode also creates a pseudorandom gen-
erator by using a block cipher. First a random IV, known as ctr, of length ` is
chosen. Each block of the random stream is then found by increasing ctr by one
and applying the pseudorandom permutation to this new value. The corresponding
random blocks and message blocks are then XORed to produce the ciphertext. More
concisely, let c0 = ctr← {0, 1}` and then for all 1 ≤ i ≤ x let ci = Fk(ctr + i)⊕mi.
This mode is CPA-secure but also allows for random access, where the i -th block is
decrypted without decrypting any other block of ciphertext.
Constructing Pseudorandom Permutations
It still has not been discussed how to construct a strong pseudorandom permutation. Note
that to construct a truly random permutation for strings of length ` requires ` · 2` bits of
memory. Such a permutation would be constructed by ﬁlling a lookup table with truly
random strings of length `. This table would have ` entries of size 2` bits. For ` = 32 this
already requires 16 gigabytes of storage. Thus we need to be able to construct a function
that is concise and small in its implementation but behaves like a random permutation.
There are two popular high-level designs for achieving this: Substitution Permutation
Networks and Feistel networks. Both of these are ways of implementing the confusion-
diﬀusion paradigm which was introduced by Shannon [35] to enable the construction of
concise, but seemingly random permutations.
The confusion-diﬀusion paradigm uses small random permutations that can be easily
stored to construct larger permutations that seem random. The ﬁrst step is to introduce
confusion into the input. For 128 bits of input this can be achieved by using 16 independent
8-bit permutations. Each of these 16 permutations is applied to a distinct set of 8 bits from
the input. The diﬀusion part is introduced by then re-ordering the bits after it has passed
through the permutations. These two steps together are called a round. Rounds are
repeated multiple times to introduce more confusion and ﬁnally create a pseudorandom
permutation.
2.3.3.1 Substitution Permutation Networks (SPN)
Substitution permutation networks are almost a direct implementation of the confusion-
diﬀusion paradigm. The confusion-diﬀusion paradigm as described above does not intro-
duce any dependency on a key. This dependency is introduced in SPNs by adding an extra
step to each round where the intermediate result is XORed with a round key. The round
key is derived from the master key, round number and some key schedule. The smaller
permutations that are used are known as substitution boxes, or S-boxes for short. Accord-
ing to Kerckhoﬀ's principle the structure of these S-boxes should be publicly known. This
does not mean that the S-boxes have to be key-independent. If key-dependent S-boxes
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Figure 2.6: Substitution Permutation Network round
are used in a cipher, as in Blowﬁsh [34], the algorithm to construct the S-boxes from the
key should still be public. Figure 2.6 shows a round in an SPN with the S-boxes labelled
S1, S2, S3, S4.
SPN designs are based on two important principles:
1. Invertible S-boxes: In order to ensure that the SPN is indeed a permutation it must
be invertible. If the S-boxes are invertible it makes each round of the SPN invertible
given the key. Since each round can be eﬃciently inverted this way the SPN is a
permutation.
2. Avalanche eﬀect: The avalanche eﬀect aims to introduce large diﬀerences in the
output of the permutation if small changes are made to the input. If a one bit ﬂip
in the input changed only one bit in the output, then the SPN would not look like
a random permutation. The avalanche eﬀect can be achieved by making a one bit
change in the input to a round result in a two bit change in the output of that
round. The mixing permutation at the end of each round then maps the output bits
of each S-box to several diﬀerent S-boxes in the next round. Thus after r rounds, a
one bit change in the input results in an approximately 2r bit change of the output.
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Figure 2.7: Feistel Round
2.3.3.2 Feistel Networks
A Feistel network does have not the design requirement of an SPN that the S-boxes used
must be invertible. A Feistel network's S-boxes are incorporated a round mangler function,
denoted fr for round r. The round mangler function also contains some operation that
is dependent on the round key which is derived from the encryption key, round number
and some key schedule. In its basic high-level design a Feistel network round, depicted in
Figure 2.7, works as follows [20]
1. The input to a round r is split into two halves, Lr−1 and Rr−1.
2. If the round mangler function is fr(x) then deﬁne Rr = Lr−1 ⊕ fr(Rr−1) and Lr =
Rr−1.
3. The output of a round is deﬁned as the concatenation of Lr and Rr.
Although the S-boxes used in a Feistel network are not invertible, a Feistel network is still
a permutation since given the output Lr‖Rr to some round r, it can be shown that each
round is invertible as follows:
1. Set Rr−1 = Lr and
2. calculateRr⊕fr(Lr) = Lr−1⊕fr(Rr−1)⊕fr(Lr) = Lr−1⊕fr(Rr−1)⊕fr(Rr−1) = Lr−1.
Thus each round of a Feistel network can be inverted given the round mangler function
and the output of that round.
We discussed the basic design principles and high-level designs of two categories of
symmetric encryption schemes. Both Feistel and Substitution Permutation Networks
were discussed as well as the modes of operation for a block cipher. This background
will be useful in understanding the techniques described in the next section regarding
white-box cryptography.
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2.4 White-box Cryptography
Introduction
In the seminal papers of Chow et al. [10, 11] the white-box attack context was introduced.
Their deﬁnition of this attack model is:
Deﬁnition 15. The White-box Attack Context
The attacker is assumed to have all the advantages of an adaptive chosen ciphertext at-
tack, plus full access to the encrypting software and control of the execution environment.
This includes arbitrary trace execution, examining sub-results and keys in memory, per-
forming arbitrary static analyses on the software, and altering results of sub-computation
(e.g. via breakpoints) for perturbation analysis.
An implementation of a cryptographic cipher is said to be white-box if it is secure in the
white-box attack context. Chow et al. motivate their consideration of this attack model
by the spread of commercial applications that employ cryptography to protect content
onto commodity hardware that is untrusted. Their work can also be seen as an extension
of previous work such as server-aided RSA [24, 8, 36]. The goal of server-aided RSA is to
enable the use of computationally heavy cryptographic schemes such as RSA on secure
hardware that is computationally weak. In this model many computations are done by a
second processor that is untrusted but computationally powerful. White-box cryptogra-
phy aims to do the entire cryptographic calculation on the more powerful but untrusted
processor without compromising the security of the cryptographic implementation.
Chow et al. present practical white-box implementations of both DES [11] and
AES [10]. The implementations proposed rely on transforming the underlying functions
of the block cipher into a network of lookup tables and hiding the key inside these tables
in such a way that an attacker cannot extract the key.
The Implementation of Chow et al.
The primary aim of the white-box implementations described by Chow et al. is to make
key recovery impossible. The key they refer to here is the original AES or DES key that
was used to create the implementation. Note that once the key has been chosen for either
of these schemes, the S-boxes and key mixing operations for each round is ﬁxed. This fact
is exploited in their implementation to change all the S-boxes and key mixing operations
into a set of key-dependent S-boxes. This unfortunately means that the same S-boxes
cannot be reused for each round and the implementation has a signiﬁcantly larger size.
These new key-dependent S-boxes are then broken up onto a network of lookup tables.
The construction of the original S-boxes are publicly known which makes key recovery
from the corresponding key-dependent implementations trivial. To counter this, they
introduce the idea of mixing bijections. The idea is that if S(·) is some key-dependent
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S-box then two random bijections F and G are deﬁned with the appropriate input size
and attached to S(·) in the following way: F−1 ◦ S(·) ◦G. This ensures that all the key-
dependent S-boxes have local security, meaning that these encoded S-boxes themselves
do not leak any information about the key they contain. This is because the input and
output of the entire lookup network for an encoded S-box can stay the same even if the
S-box in the middle is changed by adapting F and G. If in the original implementation
two S-boxes had to be evaluated after each other such as S1(·) ◦ S2(·) then with the
mixing bijections it becomes (F−1 ◦ S1(·) ◦G) ◦ (G−1 ◦ S2(·) ◦H). Thus the input mixing
bijection to S2(·) is cancelled out by the output mixing bijection of S1(·). While these
mixing bijections provide local security for each S-box, they only force the attacker to
inspect a greater amount of the implementation to recover the key. The S-boxes are also
shued so that the attacker cannot be sure which S-box is implemented in a certain set
of lookup tables.
Cryptanalysis
Both of the white-box implementations presented by Chow et al. have been successfully
broken in [3, 17, 40]. Of note is the claim by Wyseur in [39] that block ciphers using Feistel
rounds are susceptible to the cryptanalysis presented due to their inherent structure design
which only modiﬁes half of the input to each round. It is unclear whether this attack is
aided by the ﬁxed S-boxes of DES and if other Feistel round ciphers that use key-dependent
S-boxes, such as Blowﬁsh [34], will be as susceptible to cryptanalysis.
An attack has been demonstrated in [40] in which they exploit non-random prop-
agation of plaintext changes in the structure of the the DES implementation. These
propagations are used to identify S-boxes and the inputs to these S-boxes. The key is
then recovered by guessing a bit and then checking the eﬀect of this guess to determine
one other bit of the key. This attack ﬁnally gives two complementary keys that are both
valid due to the complementation property of DES.
The methods discussed so far have all required that both parties attempting to com-
municate have access to some shared key. In the following sections we will discuss methods
in which two parties can agree on a key to use without having access to a secure channel
for transferring the key.
2.5 Public Key Cryptography
Even though public key cryptography oﬀers an attractive advantage over symmetric
schemes, it has not replaced the use of symmetric schemes. Most asymmetric schemes
suﬀer from ciphertext expansion, where the ciphertext is larger by a factor of 2 or more
than the message that is being encrypted. The exponentiation of large integers used by
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asymmetric schemes also takes longer than the substitution rounds used by symmetric
schemes. Public key schemes allow for the creation of a secure channel between two par-
ties through which a random symmetric key can be transmitted when only an unsecured
channel is available to them. The rest of the message is then encrypted using this sym-
metric key together with a symmetric scheme. We present two popular and standardized
public key schemes here.
Before we introduce some practical asymmetric schemes a short discussion on groups
and number theory is given which is required in order to understand how the presented
schemes work.
2.5.1 Number Theory and Groups
To understand the way that security is proven for asymmetric encryption schemes the
concept of a abelian group must ﬁrst be introduced. Asymmetric schemes can be im-
plemented using any underlying abelian group but they can only be proven secure when
using certain groups. The groups that give security to these schemes depend on which
problems the scheme assumes are unsolvable in polynomial time. For an abelian group a
binary operation on a set G is a function that takes as input two elements from the set
G. Formally an abelian group is deﬁned as [20]:
Deﬁnition 16. Abelian Group
A set G together with a binary operation ◦ is an abelian group if the following prop-
erties all hold
1. (Closure) For all g, h ∈ G it holds that g ◦ h ∈ G.
2. (Identity element) There exists an identity element e ∈ G such that for all g ∈ G,
e ◦ g = g = g ◦ e.
3. (Inverse) For any g ∈ G there exists an element h ∈ G, known as the inverse of g,
such that g ◦ h = e = h ◦ g.
4. (Associativity) For all g1, g2, g3 ∈ G it holds that (g1 ◦ g2) ◦ g3 = g1 ◦ (g2 ◦ g3).
5. (Commutativity) For all g, h ∈ G, g ◦ h = h ◦ g.
For a set and a binary operation to be classiﬁed as a group all these properties except
commutativity have to hold. If a abelian group has a ﬁnite number of elements then it
is known as a ﬁnite abelian group. We let |G| denote the number of elements in a ﬁnite
group, also known as its order.
It can be shown that a group has a unique identity element and each element in the
group has a unique inverse. A group can be described using either additive or multiplica-
tive notation. For this thesis we will use the latter. With multiplicative notation the
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group operation applied to two elements g, h is denoted g · h or gh, the inverse of g is
denoted by g−1 and the identity element is denoted by 1. Repeated application of the
group operation will be denoted by exponentiation: g · g · g = g3. From these deﬁnitions
the following can be proven [20]
Lemma 17. Let G be a group and a, b, c ∈ G. If ac = bc then a = b. In particular, if
ac = c then a is the identity element of G.
Proof. Suppose it is known that ac = bc. Multiplying both sides with the unique inverse
c−1 of c, we obtain a = b:
ac = bc⇒ (ac) · c−1 = (bc) · c−1 ⇒ a(cc−1) = b(cc−1)⇒ a = b. (2.8)
Theorem 18. Let G be a ﬁnite abelian group with ` = |G|, the order of the group. Then
for any element g ∈ G, g` = 1.
Proof. Choose an arbitrary g ∈ G and let g1, . . . , g` be the elements of G. We claim that
g1 · g2 · · · g` = (gg1) · (gg2) · · · (gg`). (2.9)
To see this, note that ggi = ggj implies gi = gj by Lemma 17 therefore each of the
` elements in parentheses on the right-hand side of (2.9) is unique. Because there are
exactly ` elements in G the product on the right-hand side is simply the elements of G
being multiplied together in some permuted order. Since G is associative the order of
multiplying the elements together does not matter and thus the left-hand side is equal to
the right-hand side.
Using the fact that G is abelian we can write
g1 · g2 · · · g` = (gg1) · (gg2) · · · (gg`) = g` · (g1 · g2 · · · g`) (2.10)
which by Lemma 17 implies that 1 = g`.
Using this theorem the following corollary can be proved which allows for the exponent
to be reduced modulo the group order. This corollary is later used to prove the correctness
of the RSA encryption scheme.
Corollary 19. Let G be a ﬁnite group with ` = |G| > 1. Then for any g ∈ G and any
integer i it holds that gi = gi (mod `).
Proof. Let i = q`+ r with q, r ∈ Z and r = i (mod `). Using Theorem 18,
gi = gq`+r = gq` · gr = (g`)q · gr = 1q · gr = gr, (2.11)
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as claimed.
Some asymmetric schemes use the concept of a cyclic group [20]:
Deﬁnition 20. Cyclic Group and Generators
A group G with |G| = ` is said to be cyclic if there exists a g ∈ G for which the
sequence g, g2, g3, . . . , g` contains every element in G. Such a g is called a generator of G.
Proposition 21. Let G be a cyclic group with |G| = ` and g a generator of G. Then for
any x, y ∈ Z we have that gx = gy if and only if x = y (mod `).
Proof. If x = y (mod `) then x (mod `) = y (mod `) and from Corollary 19 it holds that
gx = gx (mod `) = gy (mod `) = gy. (2.12)
For the other direction we have gx = gy and let x′ = x (mod `), y′ = y (mod `). Again
from Corollary 19 it holds that gx
′
= gy
′
or equivalently that gx
′ (
gy
′)−1
= 1. If x′ 6= y′ it
can be assumed without loss of generality that x′ > y′. Since both x′ and y′ are smaller
than `, the diﬀerence x′ − y′ is then a non-zero integer smaller than `. But then
1 = gx
′
(
gy
′
)−1
= gx
′−y′ , (2.13)
which means the sequence g, g2, g3, . . . , g` will be equivalent to
g, g2, g3, . . . , gx
′−y′−1, 1, g, . . . , g` (2.14)
and contain at most x′−y′ < ` elements of G contradicting the claim that g is a generator
of G.
Having discussed the required concepts two practical public key encryption schemes
will now be introduced.
2.5.2 RSA
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman published one of the ﬁrst public key schemes. They devel-
oped the RSA algorithm in 1978 [20]. If N is the product of two distinct primes, also
known as a semiprime, then the RSA encryption scheme encrypts integers chosen from
the set Z∗N . Z∗N is the group of all integers smaller than N which is also relatively prime
to it and is an abelian group under multiplication modulo N . The order of this group is
given by the Euler totient function, φ(N). Because N is the product of two primes p and
q, it is known that φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). The algorithm is still practical today if large
enough primes are used. The security of this scheme relies on the RSA assumption. First
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deﬁne GenRSA(λ) as follows:
Deﬁnition 22. GenRSA(λ)
1. Choose primes p and q, with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ, and calculate N = pq.
2. Find e such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1.
3. Determine d = e−1 (mod φ(N)).
Then we deﬁne the security experiment RSA− invA,GenRSA(λ):
Deﬁnition 23. The RSA experiment RSA− invA,GenRSA(λ)
1. Run GenRSA(λ) to obtain (N, e, d).
2. Choose a random y ← Z∗N .
3. The attacker A is given (N, e, y) and outputs x ∈ Z∗N .
4. The output of the experiment is 1 if xe = y (mod N).
And ﬁnally we can deﬁne the RSA hardness assumption:
Deﬁnition 24. RSA Hardness Assumption
The RSA problem is hard relative to GenRSA if, for all probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms A, there exists a negligible function negl such that
Pr [RSA− invA,GenRSA(λ) = 1] ≤ negl(λ). (2.15)
The RSA assumption is that there exists a GenRSA for which it is computationally
infeasible to ﬁnd ye
−1
(mod N) without knowing the value of φ(N).
To see that d is the solution to the problem we apply Corollary 19. Thus if x = yd,
then
xe =
(
yd (mod φ(n))
)e
= ye
−1e = y (mod N). (2.16)
In order to ﬁnd e−1 (mod φ(N)) an attacker must determine φ(N). It is believed to be
computationally infeasible to ﬁnd φ(N) from N since no polynomial time algorithm has
yet been found for factoring an integer and these problems can be shown to be equivalent.
This does not mean that there are no other attack vectors to the RSA assumption, only
that the RSA problem is at most as hard as factoring.
There are several known attacks on the direct implementation of the RSA problem
as a cryptographic scheme when choosing y as the message to be encrypted. A direct
implementation is deterministic and thus vulnerable to chosen plaintext attacks. This
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leads to the development of padded RSA which is the implementation that should be
used [20]:
Deﬁnition 25. Padded RSA
Let GenRSA be as before and let ` be a function with `(λ) < 2λ− 2 for all λ. Deﬁne
a public-key encryption scheme as
 Gen: on input λ, run GenRSA(λ) to obtain (N, e, d). Output the public key pk =
(N, e) and the private key sk = (N, d).
 Enc: on input a public key pk = (N, e) and a message m ∈ {0, 1}`(λ), choose a
random string r ← {0, 1}‖N‖−`(λ)−1. Because all positive integers have a binary
representation the concatenated string r‖m can be interpreted as an element of ZN .
Calculate and output the ciphertext
c = (r‖m)e (mod N). (2.17)
 Dec: on input a private key sk = (N, d) and a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗N , compute
mˆ = cd (mod N), (2.18)
and the binary representation of mˆ will be equal to the string r‖m. Outputting the
`(λ) low-order bits of mˆ gives the original message m.
The added random bits prohibits the attacker from executing a chosen plaintext attack.
Also, half of the ciphertext is used to encrypt the random data, leading to the ciphertext
expansion.
While the RSA encryption scheme relies solely on the RSA assumption and must
be implemented over the integers other public key schemes exists such that it works for
several diﬀerent underlying groups. El Gamal is one such scheme.
2.5.3 El Gamal
The El Gamal encryption scheme is a public key encryption scheme that allows for some
ﬂexibility toward which underlying group is used in its implementation. This is diﬀerent
from RSA where only the group Z∗N works.
If Gen is a polynomial time algorithm that on input λ generates a group and returns
its description G, the order of the group q, with ‖q‖ = λ, and g a generator of the group,
the El Gamal encryption scheme is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 26. The El Gamal encryption scheme
 Gen: on input λ run Gen(λ) to obtain (G, q, g). Then choose a random x← Zq and
compute h = gx. The public key is (G, q, g, h) and the private key is (G, q, g, x).
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Figure 2.8: An example Weierstraß curve over R
 Enc: on input a public key pk = (G, q, g, h) and a message m ∈ G, choose a random
y ← Zq and output the ciphertext
c = (gy, hy ·m) . (2.19)
 Dec: on input a private key sk = (G, q, g, x) and a ciphertext (c1, c2), output
m =
c2
cx1
. (2.20)
Decryption works correctly because c2
cx1
= h
y ·m
(gy)x
= (g
x)y ·m
gxy
= m. This encryption scheme
has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen plaintext attack given that the Decisional
Diﬃe Hellman (DDH) problem is hard relative toG [20]. The DDH problem can be deﬁned
as [20]:
Deﬁnition 27. The Decisional Diﬃe Hellman problem
Given a cyclic group G and a generator g ∈ G, deﬁne DHg(h1, h2) = gloggh1·loggh2 .
The DDH problem is to distinguish DHg(h1, h2) from a random group element with non-
negligible probability for a randomly chosen h1 and h2.
One group for which it is believed that the DDH problem is hard is the group of
points on an elliptic curve. The group operation for points on an elliptic curve is known
as addition but is very diﬀerent from addition of integers or vectors. Adding two points
on an elliptic curve is described in more detail in the next section.
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2.5.4 Elliptic Curves and Bilinear Maps
An elliptic curve is deﬁned over the ﬁnite ﬁeld Fp and can be represented by the Weierstraß
equation y2 = x3 + ax + b with a, b ∈ Fp and p a prime [22]. There is an additional
requirement that 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. This requirement ensures that there exists a tangent at
every point on the curve. The elliptic curve, known as E(Fp), is then the set of points
(x, y) ∈ F2p that satisfy the Weierstraß equation y2 = x3 + ax + b together with a special
point known as O. This point is deﬁned to be at inﬁnity.
E(Fp) has a group structure with O being the identity element of the group. The
binary operation of the group is commonly described as addition and has a simple geo-
metric interpretation. To sum two points in E(Fp) a line is drawn through them and the
third intersection the line makes with the curve is taken as the negative of the answer.
Since the curve is symmetrical around the x-axis there exists a point on the curve that
has the same x coordinate but the negative of the y coordinate. This point is taken as
the sum of the previous two points. This is shown in Figure 2.8.
For the three points P (xP , yP ), Q(xQ, yQ), R(xR, yR) with P + Q = R this group op-
eration can be deﬁned as
xR =
(
yQ − yP
xQ − xP
)2
− xP − xQ, yR = yQ − yP
xQ − xP (xP − xR)− yP . (2.21)
This deﬁnition does not work if P = Q since then the denominator (xQ − xP ) would be
zero. If P = Q the following deﬁnition for the group operation is used instead
xR =
(
3x2P + a
2yP
)2
− 2xP , yR = 3x
2
P + a
2yP
(xP − xR)− yP . (2.22)
When using a elliptic curve a base point g ∈ Fp is chosen and all other points are
simply multiples of this point. Note that g is not necessarily a generator for E(Fp) but
is the generator of a subgroup. The order of this subgroup is usually chosen to be prime
when using elliptic curves for cryptographic purposes.
Elliptic curves also allow for a construction known as a bilinear map, which we shall
discuss next.
Bilinear Maps
Deﬁnition 28. Bilinear Map
Let G1, G2 and GT be cyclic groups that have the same order. A bilinear map e :
G1 ×G2 → GT is a mapping such that for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2 and a, b ∈ Z it holds that
e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. (2.23)
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From this deﬁnition the following lemma can be proven:
Proposition 29. If g is a generator of G1, G1 = G2 and u = g
a, v = gb, w = gc for any
a, b, c ∈ Z it holds that e(uv, w) = e(u,w) · e(v, w).
Proof.
e(uv, w) = e(gagb, gc1)
= e(g, g)ac+bc
= e(g, g)ac · e(g, g)bc
= e(ga, gc) · e(gb, gc)
= e(u,w) · e(v, w). (2.24)
Deﬁnition 28 allows for degenerate maps. A degenerate bilinear map takes any pair
of inputs and outputs the identity element of the group GT . To address this issue an
admissible bilinear map is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 30. Admissible Bilinear Map
Let e : G1 ×G2 → GT be a bilinear map and g1 a generator of G1 and g2 a generator
of G2. e is said to be an admissible bilinear map if e(g1, g2) outputs a generator of GT
and e is eﬃciently computable.
Bilinear maps on elliptic curves were originally introduced byWeil [27] in an attempt to
break elliptic curve cryptographic systems. Recall the Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman problem
stated in Deﬁnition 27. To solve the DDH an attacker must determine if gc = gab for
random a, b ∈ Z when given g, ga, gb, gc. With a bilinear map e this is easy, as an
attacker can ﬁnd e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab and check for equality against e(g, gc) = e(g, g)c. If
e(g, g)ab = e(g, g)c then Proposition 21 implies that c = ab and thus gc = gab.
Bilinear maps have since been used as a primitive for the construction of cryptographic
schemes and has even found their way into the ﬁeld of broadcast cryptography where they
have been used to construct bandwidth-eﬃcient schemes.
2.6 Broadcast Encryption
2.6.1 Overview
The term broadcast encryption was ﬁrst used by Fiat and Naor in [16]. In their paper
they deﬁne that the goal of a broadcast encryption scheme is to allow an arbitrary set of
receivers chosen by a broadcasting centre to decrypt a secured transmission. Some of the
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viewers in the total viewer population might be dishonest and attempt to gain access to
broadcasts for which they are not part of the entitled set. These dishonest viewers can
pool their knowledge and resources to form a collusion with the intent of breaking the
security of the scheme employed by the broadcast centre. Fiat an Naor deﬁne a broadcast
encryption scheme to be k-resilient if it secure against any collusion of k dishonest viewers
out of a total of n viewers.
The physical environment in which a broadcast encryption scheme is implemented
places constraints on the amount of resources available for the scheme to use. Fiat and
Naor identify three categories of computational resources that must be considered and
which they attempt to optimize for the design and implementation of a broadcast encryp-
tion scheme:
 The number of key management message headers,
 the number of keys associated with each viewer and
 the computational eﬀort required to derive a shared session key.
The importance of each category depends on the environment in which the scheme will
be implemented.
Subsequent research into broadcast encryption presents the idea of permanent key
revocation. A temporary revocation is when a viewer is not in the entitled group for a
speciﬁc broadcast but may be included in the entitled set for some future broadcasts.
Permanent revocation happens when a viewer is identiﬁed as being dishonest and denied
access to all future broadcasts. The keys assigned to this dishonest viewer cannot be
reassigned to a new viewer and the broadcast centre has the total viewer population it
can service reduced by one. Newer schemes address this problem by updating the keys of
all honest viewers and creating a new key in place of the dishonest viewer's key.
The message header of any broadcast encryption scheme includes a description of the
entitled set. The increase of size in the message header that can be attributed to this set
description is ignored when analysing the bandwidth requirements of a particular scheme
as it is the same for all schemes, namely a simple bit vector with the indexes of the set
bits correlating with the entitled viewers.
2.6.2 Prior Work
Fiat and Naor [16] ﬁrst present a k-resilient scheme without any key management trans-
missions. This scheme uses no cryptographic assumptions to prove its security. Unfor-
tunately this scheme requires that each receiver must store
(
n
k
)
keys, which increases
exponentially in k. In the case where k = 1 this scheme requires each receiver to store
n keys. They improve the eﬃciency for this case by using the assumption that one-way
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functions exist and hence pseudorandom number generators can be constructed. These
pseudorandom number generators are then used to create a binary tree with the leaves of
the tree representing the keys in the system. This approach allows for a 1-resilient scheme
while storing only O(log(n)) keys. This scheme is broken when two receivers collude
because between them they have access to all the keys in the system.
The next scheme they present requires key management transmission overhead. They
use 1-resiliant schemes to construct k-resilient schemes. The best eﬃciency they claim is
that the key management transmission overhead will be O(k2log2(k)log(n)) and the num-
ber of keys that have to be stored at each receiver is O (k · log(k)log(n)). It is interesting
to note that the transmission overhead, as well as the number of keys that have to be
stored, is independent of the number of privileged users.
The publication of the paper by Fiat and Naor generated much interest in broadcast
encryption and many schemes have been proposed to solve the problem. These newer
schemes are unfortunately designed for one of two speciﬁc cases: either there are many
privileged users or there are very few privileged users. This means that for a very dynamic
set of privileged users two broadcast encryption systems have to be present to minimize
transmission costs. While these schemes are not useful in a very dynamic privileged set
environment, they do present some interesting ideas. The ﬁrst approach of these schemes
is to encrypt a symmetric session key several times using diﬀerent keys. These encrypted
session keys constitute the key management transmission overhead. If a receiver is in a
privileged set, it can derive a key that will be able to decrypt one of the transmitted
encrypted session keys which enables them to decrypt the message.
Naor and Lotspeich published two schemes in 2001 [30] that they call the complete
subtree and subtree diﬀerence methods. These schemes are very similar to the 1-resiliant
scheme proposed by Fiat and Naor [16] that uses binary trees. The schemes assign each
receiver to a leaf in a binary tree. The ﬁrst scheme then ﬁnds the minimum number of
subtrees needed to exclude all the non-privileged receivers and uses the keys assigned to
the roots of these subtrees to encrypt the session key. The second scheme ﬁnds subtrees
where each subtree contains some revoked receivers, but these revoked receivers make up
all the leaves of another subtree. Their schemes require a transmission overhead near
linear in the number of revoked receivers and the number of keys stored per receiver is
logarithmic.
Jho creates a scheme based on p-punctured c-intervals in [18]. A p-punctured c-interval
is an interval of at most c receivers with p or fewer revoked receivers in the interval. The
idea is that each receiver can build key chains using one-way permutations. All receivers
know all the one-way permutations assigned to their interval. Receivers cannot generate
keys for an interval which they are not part of. Their scheme makes the transmission
overhead grow linearly in the number of revoked users.
Boneh, Gentry and Waters [4] propose a scheme based on asymmetric encryption that
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does not encrypt the same key multiple times under diﬀerent keys. The values sent as
the transmission overhead is used in conjunction with a receiver's private key and the
system's public key to calculate the session key. To achieve this they use a bilinear map
to pair elements of multiplicative cyclic groups and derive the session key. For each
receiver in the system two group elements have to be included in the public key of the
system, which has to be stored on all receivers. To achieve eﬃciency in their scheme they
propose to run A systems in parallel, each servicing B receivers for a total of AB = n
receivers. An extra group element is then included in the transmission overhead so that
receivers of diﬀerent instances of schemes can still derive a common session key. The
reason for creating multiple instances in parallel is that it allows for ﬂexibility in the size
of the public key, which is linear in the total number of users for an instance. Thus the
transmission overhead will include A + 1 group elements and the public key will contain
2B + A elements. If A = B then both the public key and transmission overhead will be
O(
√
n).
Junod proposes an attribute-based encryption scheme in [19] that can evaluate AND,
OR and NOT clauses. By setting the attributes for each transmission correctly it can be
used as a product entitlement system. Their system is an extension of the Boneh, Gentry
and Waters system described above. They achieve transmission overhead of O(αψ) where
α is the number of clauses, when writing a policy in disjunctive normal form or conjunctive
normal form, and ψ is the maximum number of attributes per clause. These are attributes
that the receiver has, such as the ﬁrmware version number or geographical location. This
gives similar transmission overhead to the scheme it is based on, but with more ﬂexible
access policies.
Delerabelée, Paillier and Pointcheval propose another scheme based on bilinear maps
in [12]. Their scheme achieves better eﬃciency than the Boneh, Gentry, Waters scheme [4]
by having constant size public keys and private keys and a transmission overhead linear
in the number of revoked users. It diﬀers from the Gentry scheme by requiring more
divisions in the cyclic group. They also give a method to revoke keys in the long term by
broadcasting two group elements and a hash. This has the beneﬁt that if a compromised
key is found in a pirate network then it can be removed from the system entirely without
burdening the transmission overhead for each broadcast. Their scheme can be run in
diﬀerent modes, one of which oﬀers O(1) transmission overhead but requires more storage.
We looked at the origin of broadcast encryption and several schemes to facilitate the
eﬃcient entitlement of a privileged set of users. These broadcast encryption schemes
studied here are all resilient to a collusion of users outside the privileged set, but do not
oﬀer protection against extracting a key from the receiver itself. To protect against this
other methods of protecting the implementations of the algorithms have to be looked at.
This is where the ﬁeld of white-box cryptography can be useful.
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2.7 The workings of a Set Top Box
When designing a product entitlement system for practical use the environment in which
the system will be deployed must be taken into account. Since satellite broadcasting
networks are an example of a bandwidth constrained environment, a overview of how a
typical product entitlement system works for satellite TV networks will be given here.
Video (SD) (2Mbps)
Audio
ECM Stream (20kbps)
Video (SD) (2Mbps)
ECM Stream (20kbps)
Audio
ECM Stream (20kbps)
Audio
ECM Stream (20kbps)
EMM stream (1Mbps)
Transport Stream (60Mbps)
Figure 2.9: A typical Transport Stream
For satellite TV networks the television set itself cannot decrypt the broadcasted
content. To facilitate this decryption step each viewer is issued a set top box (STB).
Satellite TV networks operate in a pure broadcasting environment which means the STB
has no mechanism to send any information back to the broadcaster. The STB receives all
its information through a transport stream (TS). The breakdown of a typical TS is shown
in Figure 2.9 [13]. In this ﬁgure blue boxes indicate content that is directly consumed
by the end viewer and the yellow boxes represent the information needed to enable the
product entitlement system in use to work correctly. Since the TS is limited to a certain
amount of bandwidth it is in the best interest of the broadcaster to have as little as
possible of this bandwidth taken up by product entitlement information since the viewer
will only care about the data they can consume.
As can be clearly seen from Figure 2.9, there are two diﬀerent types of entitlement
information streams inside an TS: the entitlement control message (ECM) stream and
the entitlement management message (EMM) stream. An ECM stream is bound to a
speciﬁc set of audio and video streams while an EMM stream is not associated with any
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speciﬁc data stream. The ECM stream contains information necessary to decrypt its
associated audio or video stream. An ECM stream is normally around 20kbps which is
quite small when compared to the 2Mbps that the video stream requires. Because of
this each video and audio stream can have their own ECM stream associated with them
without inﬂuencing the overall bandwidth requirements by much.
The EMM stream contains the information required to access the contents of the ECM
stream. A satellite broadcaster typically oﬀers a large variety of channels, too many to ﬁt
into a single TS and thus broadcast their content across several diﬀerent TSs at the same
time. Unfortunately an STB can only tune into one TS at a time and can therefore only
access the EMM stream in the TS it is tuned to. This presents a problem when a viewer
changes to a channel in a diﬀerent TS since now the STB has to wait for the necessary
information to be sent across the EMM stream so that it can access the associated ECM
stream. To address this problem the EMM stream is replicated across all TSs that a
broadcaster is using. The EMM stream then contains the information needed by an STB
to access any ECM stream if that receiver is in the privileged set that is allowed to do
so. The EMM stream is given more bandwidth than each of the ECM streams because
the EMM stream is associated with all subscribers of the network. Due to the broadcast
nature of satellite networks the broadcaster has no feedback whether or not an STB has
received a speciﬁc EMM. The STB might have been switched oﬀ or be experiencing bad
reception. This requires the broadcaster to repeatedly send EMMs to ensure that all
STBs receive them. Because an EMM stream is chosen to be around 1Mbps, in a network
of 3.5 million subscribers (like DStv has in South Africa [29]), it would take 15 minutes
of faultless transmission to broadcast a single EMM for each STB.
We have described the TS that is received by the STB, but how does that STB handle
all this diﬀerent information? We will describe now in more detail how product entitlement
occurs in an STB.
Figure 2.10 depicts part of an STB. The conditional access (CA) Client receives in-
formation in the TS that allows it to calculate the key under which the video and audio
streams are encrypted. This key is then passed to the system-on-chip (SoC) which de-
crypts the video content and renders it. The SoC and CA client are implemented sepa-
rately and in most STBs the CA client is embedded in a tamper resistant smart card but
it is also possible to do it in software. This approach allows the CA client to be easily
changed without having to reproduce the video rendering hardware. We will now describe
the exact process that an STB follows to decrypt a video broadcast.
The STB ﬁrst receives a unique EMM. This is an EMM that is intended for a speciﬁc
CA client, but since all STBs can read the EMM stream this EMM is encrypted under
a master key (MK) which is unique to the CA client for which the EMM is intended.
This EMM contains a selection of broadcast encryption (BE) keys. These keys are used
with the broadcast encryption scheme that the broadcaster has chosen. Once the BE keys
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Figure 2.10: Inside an STB
have been decrypted the STB waits for the correct group EMM to be received. Typically
each receiver is assigned to a group of 1024 STBs [21] due to restrictions on how large the
EMMs can be. A group EMM is intended only to be used by receivers in that group. The
contents of such a group EMM can only be utilised correctly using the BE keys sent to
receivers in a unique EMM. The BEcomp steps takes the BE keys together with the group
EMM and computes a new key called a group key. For all receivers in a group that are
entitled to decrypt a broadcast this calculated group key will be the same.
Each ECM contains a single encrypted key called a code word (CW). This CW is
essentially 48 bits long, which can be brute forced within a day [15]. For this reason
the CW used to encrypt the video broadcast is changed every ten seconds as it is still
infeasible to ﬁnd a 48 bit key in such a short time. These CW are decrypted using the
previously computed group key. This CW is then encrypted again under a key k, which is
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unique to the STB's SoC, to protect it when being transferred from the CA client to the
SoC. Once inside the SoC the CW is decrypted and then used as key input to the common
scrambling algorithm (CSA) to decrypt the video content. The use of this algorithm is
mandated by the DVB-CSA standard. Finally, the SoC renders the video and outputs it
to the connected television set.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter we looked at the ﬁeld of cryptography and some of the various primitives
and security deﬁnitions it uses to construct secure schemes. An overview of white-box
cryptography is given as we will design our scheme to be secure in the white-box attack
model. Our particular focus falls more in the public key cryptography domain and then
we described some modern broadcast encryption schemes. Finally we looked at how a set
top box interacts with broadcasted information to extract key information to send to the
conditional access client so we can design a product entitlement scheme that will work
within this framework.
We have now laid the necessary groundwork to proceed to design a bandwidth eﬃcient
broadcast encryption scheme to be used in a product entitlement system.
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Broadcast Encryption Schemes
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will detail two existing broadcast encryption schemes and then several
of our attempts at designing a secure broadcast encryption scheme. These broadcast
encryption schemes will be used to implement a product entitlement system. The two
main design considerations for our broadcast encryption scheme are:
Collusion resistance: the scheme must be secure against any number of colluders
operating in the white-box attack model. We make no assumptions on the ﬁnancial aid
available to the colluders. Thus they can buy any number of legitimate decoders that
they require and we have to design for this case.
Bandwidth eﬃcient: we prioritize low bandwidth usage in the scheme. As the sys-
tem is being designed to run on satellite and terrestrial broadcasting networks, bandwidth
is at a premium compared to storage, memory and computing power. A scheme will be
bandwidth eﬃcient if the number of keys in the message header is independent of the size
of the total population and entitled set.
All the schemes detailed here are non-dynamic schemes. This means that an upper
limit on the total viewer population is set during the setup phase of the scheme. Thus
the scheme will be deﬁned by the following set of algorithms:
 Setup(λ, n): Takes as input a security parameter λ and a number of viewers n, and
outputs the parameter sets P and S. Each viewer i only receives their parameters
Pi ∈ P while the centre keeps the set of system parameters S secret.
 Encrypt(S,S): Takes as input the set of entitled viewer indices S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and
set of system parameters S. It outputs a pair (D,K). Here D is information given
to all receivers and is known as the message header. K is the key used to encrypt
the message that is to be broadcasted.
 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D): Takes as input a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, a viewer index i ∈
40
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{1, . . . , n}, viewer parameters Pi for viewer i and message header D. If i ∈ S, then
the algorithm outputs the message encryption key K, otherwise a random value
K ′ 6= K.
The system is required to be correct, meaning that for all S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and all i ∈ S,
Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D) = K if P ,S ← Setup(λ, n) and D,K ← Encrypt(S,S).
We warn the reader upfront that none of our proposed schemes achieve the ﬁrst design
requirement, collusion resistance. We will ﬁrst detail the construction for each of the two
existing schemes and then move on to our newly proposed schemes. It will also be shown
how to break the security of each of the newly designed schemes. For one scheme we supply
a security proof. We then show how this proof is ﬂawed and how to eﬃciently break the
system. As our attempts at designing a collusion resistant scheme were unsuccessful,
methods to protect the calculated key from being extracted directly from memory were
not investigated.
3.2 Existing Schemes
When designing any system it is important to compare it to existing systems in order to
evaluate its eﬀectiveness. We have identiﬁed bandwidth eﬃciency as the most important
design consideration. In Table 3.1, taken from [41], a variety of broadcast encryption
schemes are listed together with the theoretical amount of bandwidth each scheme will
use. Here k indicates the maximum size of the collusion against which the scheme stays
secure. From the this table it can clearly be seen that BGW1 and DPP1 have the best
bandwidth eﬃciency of the listed schemes and we will thus compare our designed schemes
practically against these schemes.
We will now describe how each of these two schemes works before moving on to describe
our designed schemes.
3.3 BGW1
3.3.1 Overview
The scheme ﬁrst generates a sequence of values g1, g2, . . . , gn, gn+2, . . . , g2n. Note that the
value gn+1 is missing from this sequence and the security assumption is that gn+1 cannot
be found from this sequence alone. The scheme also deﬁnes a bilinear map e(·, ·) for the
sequence and to gain access to the broadcast each viewer must calculate e(gn+1, g
t) when
receiving gt from the broadcast centre.
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Table 3.1: List of Broadcast Encryption Schemes
Scheme Bandwidth overhead Storage at centre Storage at receiver
ABBE [41] O(log n) N/A O(log n+m)
Subset-Diﬀ [16] O(k2 · log2 k · log n) O(n) O(k · log k · log n)
BGW1[4] O(1) N/A O(n)
BGW2[4] O(n
1
2 ) N/A O(n
1
2 )
NNL1[30] O(k log(n/k)) N/A O(log n)
NNL2[30] O(k) N/A O(log
2 n)
DPP1[12] O(1) N/A O(n)
DPP2[12] O(k) N/A O(1)
BW [7] O(n
1
2 ) N/A O(n
1
2 )
LT [38] O(k) N/A O(log n)
ACP [42] O(n) O(n) O(1)
Flat-Table [9] O(log n) O(log n)/O(n) O(log n)
Flat-Table-ABE [9] O(log2 n) O(log n)/O(n) O(log n)
3.3.2 Setup(λ, n):
On input (λ, n) generate a prime p with ‖p‖ = λ and bilinear groups G,G1 of order p
with bilinear map e : G×G→ G1. Pick a random generator g ← G and integer α← Zp.
Compute the elements gi = g
αi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n + 2, . . . , 2n. Note that gn+1 is not
calculated. Pick a random integer γ ← Zp that will be kept secret by the centre. The
viewer parameters are
Pi = (e(·, ·), 〈gi〉 , gγ, gγi ) (3.1)
and the system parameters are
S = (e(·, ·), 〈gi〉 , gγ) (3.2)
where 〈gi〉 =
{
gα
i|i = 1, 2, . . . , n, n+ 2, . . . , 2n
}
.
3.3.3 Encrypt(S,S):
On input (S,S) choose a random element t← Zp, set the encryption key
K = e(gn, g1)
t = e(gα
n
, gα)t = e(g, g)α
n+1t (3.3)
and the message header
D =
(
gt, (gγ ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t
)
. (3.4)
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3.3.4 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
On this input, with message header D =
(
gt, (gγ ·∏j∈S gn+1−j)t), viewer i calculates the
decryption key
e
(
gi, (g
γ ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t
)
/e
(
gt,
(
gγi ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j+i
))
= e
(
gα
i
, (gγ ·
∏
j∈S
gn+1−j)t
)
/e
(
gt,
(
gα
iγ ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j+i
))
, since gi = g
αi
= e
(
gα
i
, (gn+1−i)t
)
· e
(
g, (gγ ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j)
)αit
/e
(
g,
(
gα
iγ ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j+i
))t
= e
(
g, gα
n+1−it
)αi
· e
(
g, (gγ ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j)
)αit
/e
(
g,
(
gγ ·
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
gn+1−j+i
))αit
= e (g, g)α
iαn+1−it
= e (g, g)α
n+1t
= K (3.5)
which is identical to the original encryption key used to encrypt the message using sym-
metric encryption.
3.3.5 Security
This construction bases its security on the assumption that the `-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman
Exponent assumption is hard. This assumption is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 31. `-Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent Assumption
Let G be a bilinear group of prime order p with bilinear map e : G×G→ G1. Given
the vector of 2`+ 1 elements(
h, g, gα, gα
2
, . . . , gα
`
, gα
`+2
, . . . , gα
2`
,
)
∈ G2`+1
calculate e(g, h)α
`+1
.
The decryption key in the scheme adds an additional value t to the exponent to allow
for multiple encryptions to take place.
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3.4 DPP1
3.4.1 Overview
In this scheme each viewer is assigned a linear polynomial of the form γ + xi with γ
unknown and xi known. While γ and xi are constant for the scheme it helps to concep-
tuality regard γ as the variable in a linear polynomial. The viewer is given a value which
contains xi
γ+xi
in the exponent and to calculate the session key they must remove the 1
γ+xi
part from the exponent. Because γ is kept secret from the viewer they cannot do so easily.
The broadcast centre then includes information in the message header which the viewer
can use to introduce γ
γ+xi
into the exponent and then calculate xi
γ+xi
+ γ
γ+xi
= 1 and thus
removing 1
γ+xi
.
3.4.2 Setup(λ, n):
On input (λ, n) generate a prime p with ‖p‖ = λ and bilinear groups G,G1 of order p
with bilinear map e : G × G → G1. Choose two random generators (g, h) ← G, and an
integer γ ← Zp that is kept secret by the centre and set w = gγ. For each viewer i select
an integer xi ← Zp and set ai = g
xi
γ+xi , bi = h
1
γ+xi . The viewer parameters are
Pi = (e(·, ·), ai, 〈xi〉 , 〈bi〉) (3.6)
and the system parameters are
S = (e(·, ·), g, h, w, γ, 〈xi〉) . (3.7)
3.4.3 Encrypt(S,S):
On input (S,S) set R = S¯ and choose a random t ← Zp. Calculate r =
∏
i∈R
1
γ+xi
, set
message header
D =
(
wt, htr
)
(3.8)
and encryption key
K = e(g, h)tr. (3.9)
3.4.4 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
On the input viewer i calculates the revoked set R = S¯ and bri with r =
∏
j∈R
1
γ+xj
. An
algorithm which can be used to ﬁnd bri is described later. Next the viewer calculates the
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decryption key
e
(
wt, bri
) · e (ai, htr)
= e
(
gγ, h
1
γ+xi
)tr
· e
(
g
xi
γ+xi , htr
)
= e (g, h)
γtr
γ+xi · e (g, h)
xitr
γ+xi
= e (g, h)
(γ+xi)tr
γ+xi
= e(g, h)tr
= K (3.10)
which is the original encryption key.
In order to calculate this session key the viewer must know the value bri with
r =
∏
j∈R
1
γ + xj
. (3.11)
While every viewer knows the value of all xi, without knowledge of γ they cannot straight-
forwardly calculate r. Delerablée et al. [12] describes a generic method that is used in all
three schemes they present for calculating bri . Because we only use one of the schemes
they propose we will present the method we found and use to calculate bri .
From the deﬁnition bi = h
1
γ+xi it follows that
bri = h
1
γ+xi
·∏j∈R 1γ+xj (3.12)
and the exponent can be rewritten in its partial fraction expansion
1
γ + xi
·
∏
j∈R
1
γ + xj
=
ψi
γ + xi
+
∑
j∈R
ψj
γ + xj
(3.13)
which implies that
bri = h
(
ψi
γ+xi
+
∑
j∈R
ψj
γ+xj
)
= h
ψi
γ+xi ·
∏
j∈R
h
ψj
γ+xj
= bψii ·
∏
j∈R
b
ψj
j . (3.14)
If a viewer solves for all ψ they can calculate bri without knowledge of γ because all viewers
know all values of xi and bi.
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3.4.5 Security
The security of this construction is based on the assumption that the General Diﬃe-
Hellman Exponent and General Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent problems are com-
putationally infeasible. These problems are deﬁned as [12]:
Deﬁnition 32. General Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent Problem
Let G,G1 be cyclic groups of order p with bilinear map e : G × G → G1. Set g0 a
generator of G and g = e(g0, g0). If P and Q are two s-tuple of m-variate polynomials
with P = (1, p2, . . . , ps) and Q similarly we deﬁne F as
F =
∑
1≤i,j≤s
ai,jpipj +
∑
1≤i≤s
biqi
with ai,j, bi ∈ Zp.
Given the vector
H(x1, . . . , xm) = (g
p1(x1,...,xm)
0 , . . . , g
ps(x1,...,xm)
0 , g
q1(x1,...,xm), . . . , gqs(x1,...,xm)) ∈ Gs ×GsT ,
compute gF (x1,...,xm).
Deﬁnition 33. General Decisional Diﬃe-Hellman Exponent Problem
Given the vector H(x1, . . . , xm) ∈ Gs × GsT as above and T ∈ GT , decide if T =
gF (x1,...,xm).
3.5 The Initial Design: Hiding the Group Order
3.5.1 Design Choices
The ﬁrst design tried to utilize subgroups in elliptic curves of non-prime order. Such
elliptic curve groups were used by Boneh et al. [5] to construct a homomorphic encryption
scheme which allows for inﬁnite additions but only one multiplication to take place. While
the entire group order, a semiprime, is known, the scheme operates in a subgroup that is
of order one of the prime factors of the total group order. This has the eﬀect of creating
a hidden group order that is unknown to the attacker. It has to be noted that this group
order is only hidden so long as the attacker is unable to factor the total group order. Thus
the sizes of the primes must be chosen accordingly. In our scheme if an attacker executes
the Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D) algorithm they would calculate a value Kai , where K is the session
key and the assumption was made that an attacker would not be able to remove ai from
the exponent without knowing the hidden group order. This assumption is shown to be
false in Section 3.5.6.
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3.5.2 Overview
As mentioned before the order of the group used in the scheme is a semiprime. From
this group two subgroups are created with distinct orders, each of which has a unique
generator. One of these generators is used to create a blinding factor and the other to
calculate the session key. Each viewer is assigned a user parameter ai and all viewers
in the system know all ai. Due to this the blinding factor is added in an attempt to
mitigate any information leakage due to the knowledge of all the ai. The generators of
the subgroups are chosen in such a way that the blinding factor is removed during the
pairing operation of a bilinear map e(·, ·). The message header contains the inverses of
all the ai values of the viewers in the entitled set and viewers can remove these inverses
by exponentiating with the correct ai values.
3.5.3 Setup(λ, n):
On input (λ, n) generate two primes p and q with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ
2
and then generate the
elliptic curve groups G and GT of order N = pq with bilinear map e : G×G→ GT . Let
g be a generator of G so that e(g, g) is a generator of GT and from Theorem 18 we have
that e (g, g)N = 1. The scheme requires a generator gp of a subgroup of order p and gq
a generator of a subgroup of order q. These generators are found by setting gp = g
q and
gq = g
p. Choose a value γ ← Zp that is kept secret by the centre.
For each viewer i in the viewer population choose a unique viewer exponent ai ← Zp
and blinding value exponent ri ← Zq. The ai values can be chosen using a pseudorandom
function F (·) and setting ai = F (i) mod p. The user parameters are
Pi =
(
N, e(·, ·), F (·), g, griq gaiγp
)
(3.15)
where e(·, ·) and F (·) respectively refer to the deﬁnitions of the bilinear map and pseudo-
random functions. The system parameters are
S = (p, q, F (·), g, e(gp, gp)γ) . (3.16)
3.5.4 Encrypt(S,S):
Let BS =
∏
i∈S a
−1
i . For each broadcast select a fresh t← Zp and set the message header
D = gtBSp (3.17)
and the encryption key
K = e(gp, gp)
γt. (3.18)
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3.5.5 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
On the input the viewer i ﬁrst calculates
e(griq g
aiγ
p , D) = e(g
ri
q g
aiγ
p , g
tBS
p )
= e(griq , g
tBS
p ) · e(gaiγp , gtBSp )
= e(gp, gq)ridBS · e(gp, gp)aiγtBS
=
(
e(g, g)N
)ritBS · e(gp, gp)aiγtBS
= e(gp, gp)
γtBSai (3.19)
and the viewer then calculates the value AˆS =
∏
j∈S,i6=j aj. Note that aiAˆSBS = 1.
Finally the viewer calculates the decryption key as
(
e(gp, gp)
γtBSai
)AˆS = e(gp, gp)γt(BSaiAˆS) = e(gp, gp)γt = K (3.20)
which is the required session key.
3.5.6 Cryptanalysis
There are two easy ways to attack the above scheme. The ﬁrst is with the aid of a single
colluder. If both attackers execute Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D) they will calculate two values Kai
and Kaj with i and j distinct and thus ai and aj distinct. If gcd(ai, aj) = 1, which for
randomly chosen ai, aj does not happen with negligible probability [31], the attackers
can ﬁnd integers X, Y such that Xai + Y aj = 1. They can then calculate the value
(Kai)X (Kaj)Y = KXai+Y aj = K which is the required session key and the scheme is
broken. This attack is known as the textbook RSA attack [20]. If all the ai are chosen
such that they all share a common factor ω > 1 and thus gcd(ai, aj) = ω the integers X
and Y cannot be found, but this does not make the scheme secure. Since gcd(ai, aj) = ω
we can write
ai = ωvi, aj = ωvj (3.21)
with vi and vj relatively prime. If the entitled set consists only of a single viewer z then
D = gta
−1
z = gtω
−1v−1z (3.22)
and instead of multiplying by az when calculating AˆS the attackers multiply by vz. This
will result in the value obtained at the end of executing Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D) to have ω−1
in the exponent:
Kω
−1ai = Kvi . (3.23)
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Similarly Kvj can be found and since gcd(vi, vj) = 1 the textbook RSA attack can still
be applied.
The second way of attacking this scheme requires no additional colluders and shows
that the inverse of any ai can be calculated, even without knowing the order of the
subgroups. It is done by using the following lemma:
Lemma 34. For any a ∈ Zp for which there exists an inverse b in Zkp for some k ∈ Z+,
b also acts as an inverse in Zp.
Proof. Since b is an inverse in Zkp it holds that ab = αkp + 1 for some α ∈ Z. Therefore
ab = αkp+ 1 = 1 mod p. Thus b also acts as an inverse for a in Zp.
Since the group order N is known to the attacker they can simply calculate a value bi
which acts as an inverse for ai modulo N and use the same value as an inverse modulo p
since N = pq. The only case where ai does not have in inverse in ZN is when gcd(ai, N) 6=
1. But since N only has two prime factors this means the gcd is either p or q and thus
the attacker can factor N by calculating this gcd.
3.6 The Rescue Attempt: True Hidden Group Orders
3.6.1 Design Choices
There are two main security ﬂaws in the previous design: the textbook RSA attack
derivative and that the attacker can calculate the inverse of any exponent they wish.
To address the latter the scheme was moved over to the group Z∗N on which RSA is
based. This group would not allow an attacker to calculate an inverse of an exponent.
Unfortunately the scheme can no longer use bilinear maps and a diﬀerent method of
removing the blinding factor had to be used.
Fiat and Naor proposed a similar scheme in [16] but in their scheme there is no blinding
factor present.
3.6.2 Overview
This scheme is similar to the one previously presented. Each viewer is assigned an expo-
nent ai that is known by all other viewers. The inverses of the exponents of viewers in the
entitled group is added to the exponent of the message header and a viewer removes them
by exponentiating with the correct ai values. Since we can no longer deﬁne a bilinear map
to be used on the keys the blinding factor is removed by exponentiation.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. BROADCAST ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 50
3.6.3 Setup(λ, n):
On input (λ, n) generate two primes p and q with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ
2
and values γ ← Z∗φ(N),
m ← Z∗N . For each viewer i choose the viewer exponent ai ← Z∗φ(N), blinding base
hi ← Z∗N , blinding value ei ← Z∗N \ Z∗φ(N) and calculate the blinding exponent di = φ(N)ei .
The ei must be chosen so that φ(N) 6 |
∏
∀i ei. The values ai can again be chosen with
some pseudorandom function F (·). The viewer parameters Pi is set to
(
N,F (·), hdii mγai
)
.
The system parameters S is set to (p, q,mγ, 〈ei〉 , F (·)).
3.6.4 Encrypt(S,S):
On input (S,S) choose t ← Z∗φ(N) and calculate ES =
∏
i∈S ei and BS =
∏
i∈S a
−1
i . Set
message header
D = tBSES (mod N) (3.24)
and encryption key
K = mESγt (mod N). (3.25)
Note that for any i ∈ S, diES = φ(N)ESei = 0 mod φ(N).
3.6.5 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
When receiving the description of the entitled set S, viewer i calculates AˆS =
∏
j∈S,i6=j aj
(again aiAˆSBS = 1) and then
(
hdii m
γai
)AˆSD
=
(
hdii m
γai
)AˆStBSES
(mod N)
=
(
h
dia
−1
i
i m
γ
)aiAˆSBSESt
(mod N)
=
(
h
a−1i
i
)diESt
(mγ)ESt (mod N)
= mESγt (mod N)
= K. (3.26)
3.6.6 Cryptanalysis
3.6.6.1 Textbook RSA Attack with Two Colluders
To illustrate the collusion resistance, take two colluding viewers x and y and two entitled
users v and w. The centre broadcasts the key kd (a
−1
v ev) (a
−1
w ew) and any viewer j not in
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S calculates:
(
h
dj
j m
γaj
)[t(a−1v ev)(a−1w ew)]avaw
=
(
h
dj
j m
γaj
)tevewa−1v ava−1w aw
=
(
h
dj
j m
γaj
)tevew
=
(
h
dj
j
)tevew (
mksaj
)tevew
=
(
htESj
)dj (
mESγt
)aj
=
(
htESj
)dj
(K)aj . (3.27)
Now assume the collusion of x and y calculates values X and Y such that Xax+Y ay =
1. The collusion now attempts to apply the textbook RSA attack:
((
htESx
)dx
(K)ax
)X
·
((
htESy
)dy
(K)ay
)Y
=
((
htESx
)Xdx · (htESy )Y dy)((K)Xax+Y ay)
=
((
hXdxx
)tES · (hY dyy )tES) · ((K)1)
=
(
hXdxESx · hY dyESy
)t ·K. (3.28)
While the attack might have isolated the session keyK as a factor, the value calculated
still contains a blinding factor of the form
((
hXdxESx
) (
h
Y dyES
y
))t
.
The derived value in (3.28) is still protected by a blinding factor. But this factor only
remains a blinding factor as long as XdxES 6= 0 mod φ(N) and Y dyES 6= 0 mod φ(N). If
both these conditions are true the collusion of two viewers can successfully calculate the
session key K. Since there is a limited number of choices for each ei, the probability that
dxES = 0 mod φ(N) is much higher than XES = 0 mod φ(N) and similarly for Y , we will
focus on the former.
Let φ(N) have ω + 1 distinct prime factors, denoted as E, which results in ω choices
for each ei. Let K be the set of colluders with |K| = k and |S| = s. We assume that
the set of keys held by the colluders is chosen uniformly at random. This is because the
collusion has no control over the assignment of keys which is done uniformly at random.
Let ES = {ei|i ∈ S}. Thus ES =
∏
∀e∈ES e.
Assume now that k = 2 and that ex and ey is associated with the two colluders. The
collusion breaks the security of the system if ex ∈ ES and ey ∈ ES. We are only interested
in the case where none of the colluders are in the entitled set i.e. x /∈ S and y /∈ S. Thus
we want to determine the probability
Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES] (3.29)
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where the elements of ES is chosen uniformly at random from E.
Since the choices of ex, ey and ES are uniformly at random and independent from each
other the events ex ∈ ES and ey ∈ ES are statistically independent. It follows then that
Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES] = Pr [ex ∈ ES] · Pr [ey ∈ ES] = Pr [ex ∈ ES]2 . (3.30)
To determine Pr [ex ∈ ES] we note that this is the probability that a set of s elements
chosen at random with replacement from a set of ω elements contains a speciﬁc element.
The number of ways of choosing a set of s elements with replacement from a set of ω
elements is given by
(
s+ω−1
s
)
. The number of sets of size s that contain a speciﬁc element
is the same as ﬁxing the ﬁrst choice to the element and then choosing the remaining s− 1
elements with replacement. This number is given by
(
s+ω−2
s−1
)
. Thus we have
Pr [ex ∈ ES] =
(
s+ω−2
s−1
)(
s+ω−1
s
)
=
(s+ω−2)!
(s−1)!(ω−1)!
(s+ω−1)!
s!(ω−1)!
=
(s+ ω − 2)!
(s+ ω − 1)! ·
s!
(s− 1)! ·
(ω − 1)!
(ω − 1)!
=
s
s+ ω − 1 . (3.31)
Using this result we can now calculate the probability of success that a collusion of
two viewers will have when applying the attack described in (3.28) as
Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES] = Pr [ex ∈ ES]2 =
(
s
s+ ω − 1
)2
. (3.32)
3.6.6.2 Textbook RSA Attack with k > 2 Colluders
For collusions with a size larger than two, any two users in the collusion can try to apply
the attack. The probability to break the scheme is therefore the probability that any
subset of two colluders exist that satisfy ex ∈ ES and ey ∈ ES.
The probability of this event not occurring is then the probability that no such subset
satisﬁes ex ∈ ES and ey ∈ ES. This probability can be described as
Pr [ex /∈ ES ∧ ey /∈ ES|x 6= y∀x, y ∈ K] . (3.33)
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Since there are
(
k
2
)
such subsets the probability can be calculated as
Pr [ex /∈ ES ∧ ey /∈ ES|x 6= y∀x, y ∈ K]
=
∏
∀x,y∈K,x6=y
Pr [ex /∈ ES ∧ ey /∈ ES]
=
∏
∀x,y∈K,x6=y
(1− Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES])
=
∏
∀x,y∈K,x6=y
(
1−
[
s
s+ ω − 1
]2)
=
(
1−
[
s
s+ ω − 1
]2)(k2)
=
(
1−
[
s
s+ ω − 1
]2) k(k−1)2
, (3.34)
ﬁnally giving the probability of breaking the scheme with a set of k colluders as
Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES, ∀x, y ∈ K, x 6= y] = 1−
(
1−
[
s
s+ ω − 1
]2) k(k−1)2
. (3.35)
Full collusion resistance for large viewer populations cannot be achieved due to the
limited number of prime factors of φ(N). This value can be increased by making the
modulus the product of more than two large prime numbers, but the larger the modulus
the larger the message header will be. This will increase the value of ω in (3.35), thus
reducing the overall probability.
3.6.6.3 Textbook RSA Attack with Multiple Moduli
But what if more than one modulus is used and several message headers are broadcast?
Viewers could then be assigned diﬀerent ei and keys for each modulus and calculate a
session key for each moduli. The diﬀerent session keys are then combined in some way to
form a single session key that is used to decrypt the content. To break this new scheme
the collusion would have to break the scheme for each modulus used. The probability
for calculating the correct key under a single modulus does not change. Thus if the new
scheme uses µ moduli the probability of the collusion breaking the scheme is
Pr [ex ∈ ES, ey ∈ ES,∀x, y ∈ Kx 6= y]µ =
(
1−
[
s
s+ ω − 1
]2)µ· k(k−1)2
. (3.36)
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of larger moduli and more moduli strategies
If instead a modulus that has µω prime factors available for use as ei values and is µ times
larger, the probability becomes
1−
(
1−
[
s
s+ µω − 1
]2) k(k−1)2
. (3.37)
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 3.1 for various parameters it is more beneﬁcial
to increase the size of the moduli (and thus ω) than broadcasting several moduli. This is
with random assignment of each ei to a viewer.
Full collusion resistance cannot be achieved even with multiple moduli and non-random
assignment of keys. Full collusion resistance implies that if a single viewer is entitled and
all others collude the collusion still cannot break the scheme. Recall that the scheme is
broken if the collusion contains two viewers with the same ei assigned to them as an ei
used as part of the message header. Thus if for any modulus the single entitled user has
the same ei as two or more other viewers the collusion can break the scheme for that
particular modulus as the other viewers are part of the collusion. This means that at
most each ei can be shared between two users for each modulus and thus full collusion
resistance can possible only be achieved for 2ω viewers.
3.7 A Rogue Attempt: Summing Elements from Z∗N
3.7.1 Design Choices
Again our designed scheme has been shown vulnerable to the textbook RSA attack.
The blinding factors used up to now have had no eﬀect in stopping the application of
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this attack. Even when the blinding factors are still present in the calculated value the
attackers can factor out the session key as shown in (3.28). This is due to the multiplicative
nature of the blinding factors with the session key. The next design tried to remove this
multiplicative property of the blinding factors by introducing a step where two parts of the
key have to be summed for the blinding factor to be removed. Summing of integers in the
set Z∗N is not common practice as it no longer behaves as a group under addition modulo
N , but in [32] Pointcheval introduces a scheme which does add 1 to an element chosen from
Z∗N . They deﬁne two new problems relating to RSA: the Computational Dependent-RSA
(C-DRSA) problem and the Extraction Dependent RSA (E-DRSA) problem:
Deﬁnition 35. The Computational Dependent-RSA (C-DRSA)
Given a large composite RSA modulus N , an integer e relatively prime to φ(N) and
an integer α ∈ Z∗N , ﬁnd (a+ 1)e mod N where α = ae mod N .
and
Deﬁnition 36. The Extraction Dependent-RSA problem (E-DRSA)
Given a large composite RSA modulus N , an integer e relatively prime to φ(N), an
integer α = ae mod N and an integer γ = (a+ 1)e mod N , ﬁnd a mod N .
Pointcheval then proves that solving these two problems is equivalent to solving the
RSA problem.
We aim to show that with high probability the set Z∗N behaves as a group under ad-
dition modulo N for any randomly chosen pair of integers from the group and that this
action does not introduce any security concerns. This is done by proving the computa-
tional hardness of factoring N and ﬁnding such a pair of integers is equivalent.
Lemma 37. Pick two primes p, q with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ
2
and let N = pq. Then ﬁnding
integers x, y ∈ Z∗N with x+y 6= N such that (x+y) mod N /∈ Z∗N is equivalent to factoring
N .
Proof. If x + y /∈ Z∗N it implies that gcd(x + y,N) 6= 1. Because N = pq with p and q
both prime it holds that gcd(x+ y,N) ∈ {1, p, q, N} , ∀x+ y ∈ R+. Since x+ y 6= N and
gcd(x + y,N) 6= 1 it holds that gcd(x + y,N) ∈ {p, q}. Since gcd(x + y,N) is eﬃciently
computable and is one of the prime factors of N , N can be factored.
For the reverse where p and q is known, choose x ← Z∗N , r ← Zp and set y =
(qr − x) mod N .
This implies that if factoring is hard then so is ﬁnding two integers in Z∗N whose sum
modulo N is not in Z∗N . Since anyone can eﬃciently sample Z∗N when knowing N it holds
that summing random elements from Z∗N will only reveal the factorisation of N with
negligible probability. We use this result to construct a broadcast encryption scheme.
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3.7.2 Overview
In this scheme there are two keys which are derived in the same manner. At the end
these keys are summed together to produce the ﬁnal decryption key. For each viewer the
sum of these keys is constant but the two values that are summed is diﬀerent for each
viewer. If these keys are derived by a viewer not in the entitled set they will have an
additional known exponent ai. Unlike previous schemes these keys will not have the same
base for diﬀerent viewers and thus the textbook RSA attack will not work. At some point
during the key calculation the key will contain a factor of the form Xbiti which needs to
be removed prior to the summing of the elements; otherwise the sum will not be constant
for any value of t. These factors are removed by supplying each viewer with a vector
containing α values of the form Xrii . These values are then used to evaluate a linear
relationship in the exponent, similar to the approaches proposed by Matsumoto in [24],
which is described in the message header and calculates the value
(
Xbii
)1−t
which is used
to remove the Xbiti factor from the key.
3.7.3 Setup(λ, n):
On input generate two primes p and q with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ
2
and let N = pq. Choose base
m← Z∗N , sum C ← Z∗N , secret value γ ← Z∗φ(N) , vector size α ≥ 2 and vector exponents
rj ← Z∗φ(N) for j = 0, . . . , α.
For each viewer i choose a viewer exponent ai ← Z∗φ(N), sum key Xi ← Z∗N and let
bi = a
−1
i mod φ(N). Next let
Yi =
(
C −Xbii
)ai
(mod N)
⇔ C = Xbii + Y bii (mod N). (3.38)
Calculate the vectors X(i) =
{
X
birj
i |j = 0, . . . , α
}
and Y (i) =
{
Y
birj
i |j = 0, . . . , α
}
.
The viewer parameters are
Pi =
(
N, 〈ai〉 , Ximγai , Yimγai , X(i), Y (i)
)
. (3.39)
The system parameters are
S = (φ(N), 〈rj〉 , 〈bi〉 ,mγ, C) . (3.40)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. BROADCAST ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 57
3.7.4 Encrypt(S,S):
The centre chooses t← Z∗φ(N) and calculates the vector Rt = {Rx |x = 0, . . . α} such that
t = 1−∑j Rjrj. Let BS = ∏i∈S bi. The centre then sets the encryption key
K = mγtC (3.41)
and the message header
D = (tBS, Rt) . (3.42)
3.7.5 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
Viewer i ﬁrst calculates
∏
j∈S,i6=j aitBS = bit. They then calculate (Xim
γai)bit = Xbiti m
γt.
Similarly they ﬁnd the value (Yim
γai)bit = Y biti m
γt.
Using Rt =
{
Rx
∣∣∣x = 0, . . . α; t = 1−∑j Rjrj} and X(i) = {Xbirji |j = 0, . . . , α} the
viewer can calculate
(
Xbii
)∑
j Rjrj =
(
Xbii
)1−t
. Similarly they can ﬁnd
(
Y bii
)1−t
using Y (i).
Multiplying the newly calculated values with the previous results gives
(
Xbiti m
γt
) (
Xbii
)1−t
= mγt
(
X
bi(t+1−t)
i
)
= mγtXbii (3.43)
and similarly mγtY bii . Summing these values ﬁnally gives
mγtXbii +m
γtY bii = m
γt
(
Xbii + Y
bi
i
)
= mγtC = K. (3.44)
3.7.6 Cryptanalysis
This scheme unfortunately becomes entirely insecure once two viewers have been part of
the entitled group only once. To see this note that
[
mγtC
]ai = [mγt (Y bii +Xbii )]ai
=
[
mγt
(
Y bii
[
1 +
(
Xi
Yi
)bi])]ai
=
(
mγtY bii
)ai [
1 +
(
Xi
Yi
)bi]ai
. (3.45)
An attacker can calculate
(
mγtY bii
)ai
by executing the Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D) algorithm
on any set of inputs for which they are not part of the entitled set. The second factor
of
[
1 +
(
Xi
Yi
)bi]ai
can be calculated by dividing the values mγtXbii and m
γtY bii and then
exponentiating with ai. These values are the two values that are summed when a viewer
calculates the session key when they are in the entitled set.
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Since the value mγtC is independent of any viewer-speciﬁc variable it means that for
two values ai and aj the values [m
γtC]
ai and [mγtC]
aj have the same base and if it happens
that gcd(ai, aj) = 1 the textbook RSA attack can easily be applied to derive the session
key mγtC.
3.7.7 Security of the Scheme Without Access to a Broadcast
It has been shown that our scheme is insecure once a pair of attackers has been in an
entitled set at least once. This does not show that security does not hold when attackers
have never been in the entitled group. Recall that Pointcheval [32] proves that ﬁnding
(a+1)e mod N from ae mod N and ﬁnding a from ae mod N and (a+ 1)e mod N together
are equivalent to solving the RSA problem. These results seem similar to what the attacker
in our scheme tries to achieve when attempting to calculate
(
mγtXbii +m
γtY bii
)ai
when
knowing only
(
mγtXbii
)ai
and
(
mγtY bii
)ai
.
3.8 A Possible Winner: Using Blinding Exponents
3.8.1 Design choices
The previous design tried to defend against the textbook RSA attack by having each
viewer get keys that had diﬀerent bases for each viewer but with exponents still known to
all viewers. The problem with the design was that at the end the calculated keys had to
be brought to the same base in order that each entitled viewer calculates the same key.
This is the weakness that is exploited by the textbook RSA attack.
The next design tries to defend against the textbook RSA attack by obfuscating the
exponents from the viewer in a similar way as the white-box implementations described
in Section 2.4. Previously the viewers would have access to all the ai values but in this
design the exact values of these would be hidden through the use of blinding exponents.
Without knowing the ai exponents an attacker cannot mount the textbook RSA attack.
They can apply the attack to the blinding exponents but this should not produce any
useful information to the attacker. We ﬁrst describe the system.
3.8.2 Overview
The entire system can be represented as a directed graph, as shown in Figure 3.2. A
unique instance of such a graph is given to each viewer at setup time. Each viewer j is
assigned a node in the graph labelled j. There are three additional nodes in the graph:
the start, intermediate and end nodes. These nodes are labelled S, I and E, respectively.
Note also that viewer i has no node associated with itself in the graph they receive.
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1
I S E
...
i− 1
i+ 1
...
n
Figure 3.2: Graph of viewer i with a total of n viewers
A viewer derives a shared session key for a group S by traversing through all the nodes,
except their own, associated with the viewers in S. Because of this movement in the graph
we deﬁne a position vector P ` for each viewer where the subscript ` indicates the number
of transitions they have made so far.
As a viewer transitions between two nodes x and y in the graph they calculate a new
position vector using the equation P `+1 = C (x, y, P `) for some transition function C that
is deﬁned later. It is only possible to transition in one direction, as the edges clearly
indicate.
3.8.3 Setup(λ, n):
3.8.3.1 The System Parameters S
Generate an integer N = pq, where p and q are primes with ‖p‖ = ‖q‖ = λ
2
. Again, λ is
the security parameter. Each node x is then assigned values ax and bx with ax ← Z∗φ(N)
and ax · bx = 1 mod φ(N), essentially an RSA key-pair. These key pairs must be distinct
from one another, thus there exists no x 6= y such that ax = ay. We also set γ = aE, the
ai value of the end node. A base value m is chosen with m← Z∗N .
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T1
T3
T2
T4
×
×
P`,0
P`,1
P`+1,0
P`+1,1
Figure 3.3: The transition function C
3.8.3.2 The Viewer Parameters Pi
Each viewer is given the modulus N as well as their own instance of the graph. This
means that the transition function C associated with an edge is not the same for two
diﬀerent viewers. From here on all newly deﬁned variables are assumed to be unique to
the viewer the parameters are being generated for. We describe the process of generating
the parameters for viewer i.
First each node x, except the end node, is assigned a blinding vector Rx =
[
rx,0 rx,1
]
with rx,0, rx,1 ← Z∗φ(N). For the end node we set RE =
[
1 0
]
. The viewer is given the
vector M i =
[
(mrS,0)ai
(mrS,1)ai
]
mod N .
Deﬁne the transition function C between two nodes x and y as a function that satisﬁes
C (x, y, P `) = P `+1 (mod N) (3.46)
with P ` =
[
mQrx,0
mQrx,1
]
and P `+1 =
[
mQayry,0
mQayry,1
]
and some unknown Q. The crucial thing to
note is that a transition to a node adds the node's ai factor to the exponent. Since the
transition function only requires the presence of the blinding factors in P `, the added ai
exponents will not be removed no matter how many times the viewer transitions.
Such a transition function C can be found by giving viewer i the transition matrix
T
(i)
x,y =
[
T1 T2
T3 T4
]
which is used to calculate:
(
mQrx,0
)T1 (
mQrx,1
)T2
= mQayry,0 (mod N) (3.47)
and (
mQrx,0
)T3 (
mQrx,1
)T4
= mQayry,1 (mod N). (3.48)
Figure 3.3 depicts the transition function where P ` =
[
P`,0
P`,1
]
and boxes represent
exponentiation.
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This leads to the congruences
T1rx,0 + T2rx,1 = ayry,0 (mod φ(N)) (3.49)
and
T3rx,0 + T4rx,1 = ayry,1 (mod φ(N)). (3.50)
For each matrix T
(i)
x,y in a graph choose T1, T3 ← Z∗φ(N) and then calculate T2 and T4
from (3.49) and (3.50) . These transition matrices are only calculated for the edges shown
in Figure 3.2. For the transition from the start to the end node the bottom row of the
matrix T
(i)
S,E is set to 0 since RE =
[
1 0
]
, but the top elements are calculated normally.
3.8.4 Encrypt(S,S):
To entitle a set S the centre chooses a value t← Z∗φ(N), broadcasts the value
D = t ·BS · (bSbI)|S|−1 (3.51)
where BS =
∏
i∈S bi and encrypts the content under the key K = m
γt. The (bSbI)
|S|−1
factor is included because to entitle |S| viewers a viewer will transition through the in-
termediate and start nodes |S| − 1 times, adding their corresponding ai factors to the
exponent each time.
3.8.5 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D):
A user has a position vector P ` with initial value M i, thus P 0 = M i. As they traverse
through the nodes this position vector is updated by applying the transition function of
an edge to it. A viewer will transition through |S| − 1 nodes associated with viewers.
This means they will also transition through the start and intermediate nodes the same
amount of times. Thus the viewer will use the position vector P 3|S|−3 when transitioning
from the start to the end node.
When transitioning from the start to the end node using P 3|S|−3 the viewer will calcu-
late the vector
P 3|S|−2 =
[
mγ·AS·(aSaI)
|S|−1
1
]T
(3.52)
where AS =
∏
i∈S ai. This top element is then exponentiated with the broadcast factor to
give
(
mγ·AS·(aSaI)
|S|−1)t·BS·(bSbI)|S|−1
= m(aSbS)
|S|−1(aIbI)|S|−1(ASBS)γt = mγt (mod N). (3.53)
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3.8.6 A Probable Proof of Security
We now present the original proof of security. There are several ﬂaws in the arguments
of this proof and they will be pointed out.
3.8.6.1 Security of the Broadcast Factor
Any dishonest viewer in the network has access to the broadcasted value t ·BS · (bSbI)|S|−1
(mod φ(N)). This group element on its own leaks no information about B or k, where B
is the set of all bi in the system. This is true because multiplication by a group element
chosen uniformly at random is equivalent to choosing the entire element uniformly at
random. To prove this we will use the following lemma from [20]:
Lemma 38. Let G be a ﬁnite group, and let m ∈ G be an arbitrary element. Then
choosing random g ← G and setting g′ = m · g gives the same distribution for g′ as
choosing random g′ ← G. I.e., for any gˆ ∈ G
Pr [m · g = gˆ] = 1|G|
where the probability is taken over random choice of g.
Proof. Let gˆ ∈ G be arbitrary. Then Pr [m · g = gˆ] = Pr [g = m−1 · gˆ]. Since g is chosen
uniformly at random, the probability that g is equal to the ﬁxed element m−1 · gˆ is exactly
1/ |G|.
We can apply this lemma to our broadcast factor because BS ∈ Z∗φ(N) and t ∈ Z∗φ(N).
By setting BS · (bSbI)|S|−1 = m and t = g it is clear that the lemma holds.
Problems with Proof
Lemma 38 proves that no information about the the bi values are leaked to an attacker.
However, it does not prove that the attacker gains no information about φ(N). The
attacker not knowing φ(N) is the basis of security in RSA-based schemes. While it is not
immediately apparent that the attacker can indeed learn φ(N) it is a crucial detail that
this lemma does not address.
3.8.6.2 Proof of Security for Construction
We will now prove the security of our broadcast encryption scheme relative to the RSA
encryption scheme. First we deﬁne the experiment BEA,Setup(λ, n, k):
Deﬁnition 39. BEA,Setup(λ, n, k)
1. Run Setup(λ, n) to obtain output P and S.
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2. Choose S← {1, . . . , n} , |S| = n− k.
3. Set (D,K) = Encrypt(S,S).
4. A is given PS¯ = {Pi |i /∈ S}, D, S and outputs K ′.
5. The output of the experiment is deﬁned to be 1 if K ′ = K, and 0 otherwise.
We say that an adversary A breaks the collusion resistance of our scheme if
BEA,Setup(λ, n, k) = 1 (3.54)
for any k < n.
We will now show that if such an A exists such that BEA,Setup(λ, n, k) = 1, we can
construct an adversary A′ that can eﬃciently break the RSA encryption scheme.
The idea is to choose a set of ai values so that all the viewers in the collusion have an
ai that is a multiple of the RSA public key e, while the ai of those in the entitled set are
relatively prime to e. With these inputs A will produce a value mX where X is relatively
prime to e. A′ can then use this value to recover the encrypted message m.
Deﬁnition 40. The adversary A′:
On input (e,N) and c = me do the following:
1. Choose a suitable n and S← {1, . . . , n}.
2. Set aS, aE ← ZN such that gcd (aS, e) = gcd (aI , e) = 1. A fairly large value for aS
(‖aS‖ w λ/2) with many factors is preferable.
3. Choose rS¯ = {ri |ri ← ZN ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \S} .
4. Set aS = {ai |ai ← ZN , gcd (ai, e) = 1 ∀i ∈ S} .
5. Set aS¯ = {ai |ai = e · ri ∀ri ∈ rS¯} .
6. Set 〈mi〉S¯ = {r |r = cri = meri = mai ∀ri ∈ rS¯} . These will later be turned into the
vectors 〈M i〉S¯ when the exponents rS,0 and rS,1 have been chosen for each i.
7. Construct
〈
T(i)
〉
S¯, 〈M i〉S¯ and γ such that it represents a valid set of transfer matri-
ces, including gcd(γ, e) = 1. This construction is shown in Section 3.8.6.3.
8. Set D = 1 and PS¯ =
(〈
T(i)
〉
S¯ , 〈M i〉S¯
)
.
9. Run A (PS¯, D,S) to obtain K ′.
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aI , rI,0, rI,1 aS, rS,0, rS,1
a1, r1,0, r1,1
C
A
B
Figure 3.4: A cycle in the graph containing one viewer
What is the value of K ′? First notice that if D = 1 then
D = (bSbI)
|S|−1 BSt = 1
⇒ t = AS (aSaI)|S|−1 (mod φ(N)). (3.55)
We know that on input PS¯, D,S the algorithm A outputs K ′ = K. In this case it would
be
K ′ = K = mγt = mγ(aSaI)
|S|−1AS . (3.56)
Because gcd (AS, e) = 1, gcd (aI , e) = 1, gcd (aS, e) = 1 and gcd (γ, e) = 1 it holds that
gcd
(
γ (aSaI)
|S|−1AS, e
)
= 1. This means integers X and Y exist such that
X
(
γ (aSaI)
|S|−1AS
)
+ Y e = 1. (3.57)
Thus K ′′ = (K ′)X · cY =
(
mγ(aSaI)
|S|−1AS
)X
· (me)Y = mX(γ(aSaI)|S|−1AS)γ+Y e = m and the
encrypted RSA message has been successfully recovered.
We have shown that our scheme is strong relative to the RSA encryption scheme. If
an adversary exists that can break our scheme then the RSA scheme is insecure as well
and since RSA has not been broken, we claim our system is secure as well. We will now
describe the step where the necessary
〈
T(i)
〉
S¯ matrices are constructed.
3.8.6.3 Constructing the T Matrix
The only step left in the proof is to show that a set of matrices
〈
T(i)
〉
S¯ , containing only
positive integers, can be constructed that represents a valid set of transition values for
the chosen ai values.
Figure 3.4 shows a cycle in the graph with only one viewer. A, B, C are the transition
matrices and the parameters associated with each node is shown next to it. Each matrix
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X is deﬁned as X =
[
X1 X2
X3 X4
]
. For the cycle to be valid the following equations must
hold:
rS,0A1 + rS,1A2 = aIrI,0 (3.58)
rS,0A3 + rS,1A4 = aIrI,1 (3.59)
rI,0B1 + rI,1B2 = a1r1,0 (3.60)
rI,0B3 + rI,1B4 = a1r1,1 (3.61)
r1,0C1 + r1,1C2 = aSrS,0 (3.62)
r1,0C3 + r1,1C4 = aSrS,1 (3.63)
At this point only aS, aI and a1 have been ﬁxed. Adding (3.58) and (3.59) yields
rS,0 (A1 + A3) + rS,1 (A2 + A4) = aI (rI,0 + rI,1) . (3.64)
Choose y, z, rS,0, rS,1 ∈ Z+ such that (rS,0y + rS,1z) |aS. Because gcd(aS, e) = 1 it implies
that gcd (rS,0y + rS,1z, e) = 1 and we can set T
(i)
S,E =
[
x y
0 0
]
and γ = rS,0y + rS,1z.
Setting A1 + A3 = aIy and A2 + A4 = aIz gives
aI (rI,0 + rI,1) = rS,0 (aIy) + rS,1 (aIz)
= aI (rS,0y + rS,1z) (3.65)
which implies that (rI,0 + rI,1) = (rS,0y + rS,1z) ⇒ (rI,0 + rI,1)| aS, a property that will
be useful later on.
The next set of steps must be repeatedly applied to each node in the graph representing
a viewer.
Consider the following two equations:
rI,0B1 + rI,1B2 − a1r1,0 = 0, (3.66)
rI,0B3 + rI,1B4 − a1r1,1 = 0. (3.67)
A solution given by [14] is B1 = B2 = B3 = B4 = a1 and r1,0 = r1,1 = rI,0 + rI,1.
Substituting the latter into (3.62) and (3.63) to solve for C yields:
(rI,0 + rI,1) (C1 + C2) = aSrS,0, (3.68)
(rI,0 + rI,1) (C3 + C4) = aSrS,1. (3.69)
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Because (rI,0 + rI,1)| aS and are all positive integers, the positive integer entries for C
can easily be found.
After these steps have been followed enough times a valid set of transfer matrices have
been constructed, ﬁnishing the proof.
Problems with Proof
In the proof, when constructing the T matrices the contents of the matrices is taken from
Z+ and not Z∗φ(N). This changes the distribution of the values from what a real instance
of the system would look like and thus the proof is faulty.
3.8.7 Cryptanalysis
The security ﬂaw in this design comes from the congruences (3.49) and (3.50). They are
T1rx,0 + T2rx,1 = ayry,0 (mod φ(N)) (3.70)
and
T3rx,0 + T4rx,1 = ayry,1 (mod φ(N)). (3.71)
The only variables known to an attacker in this context are T1, T2, T3, T4 taken from the
T
(i)
x,y matrix. Observe that these equations can be rewritten as
T(i)x,y
[
rx,0
rx,1
]
= ay
[
ry,0
ry,1
]
(mod φ(N)) (3.72)
which leads to a transition cycle from the start node being written as
T
(i)
S,IT
(i)
I,jT
(i)
j,S
[
rS,0
rS,1
]
= T
(i)
j
[
rS,0
rS,1
]
= aIajas
[
rS,0
rS,1
]
= αj
[
rS,0
rS,1
]
(mod φ(N)). (3.73)
Letting T
(i)
j =
[
Aj Bj
Cj Dj
]
creates the following two congruences:
AjrS,0 +BjrS,1 = αjrS,0 (mod φ(N)) (3.74)
and
CjrS,0 +DjrS,1 = αjrS,1 (mod φ(N)) (3.75)
with Aj, Bj, Cj and Dj known to an attacker. Multiplying the ﬁrst congruence with rS,1,
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the second with rS,0 and subtracting yields
AjrS,0rS,1 +Bjr
2
S,1 − Cjr2S,0 −DjrS,0rS,1 (3.76)
= (Aj −Dj) rS,0rS,1 +Bjr2S,1 − Cjr2S,0 (3.77)
= 0 (mod φ(N)).
Similarly the attacker can ﬁnd
(Ak −Dk) rS,0rS,1 +Bkr2S,1 − Ckr2S,0 = 0 (mod φ(N)). (3.78)
Multiplying (Ak −Dk) with (3.77) and (Aj −Dj) with (3.78) and subtracting will yield
an equation of the form
(Aj −Dj)
(
Bkr
2
S,1 − Ckr2S,0
)− (Ak −Dk) (Bjr2S,1 − Cjr2S,0) = 0 (mod φ(N)) (3.79)
which can be rewritten as β1r
2
S,1 +γ1r
2
S,0 with β1, γ1 known. Using two more T
(i)
j matrices
the attacker can ﬁnd β2r
2
S,1 + γ2r
2
S,0 = 0 mod φ(N). Multiplying and subtracting again
will yield
(β2γ1 − β1γ2) r2S,0 = 0 (mod φ(N)). (3.80)
Recall that rS,0 ∈ Z∗φ(N), which implies that (β2γ1 − β1γ2) = 0 (mod φ(N)) with
β1, β2, γ1, γ2 all known to the attacker. Thus the attacker knows a multiple of φ(N) unless
(β2γ1 − β1γ2) = 0 over the integers. Knowing this multiple of φ(N) allows an attacker to
eﬃciently factor the modulus N [6]. Once the modulus has been factored an attacker can
calculate the value of φ(N). Knowing the value of φ(N) does not imply that an attacker
can ﬁnd the values of the blinding factors, but it is possible.
This value of φ(N) is used to solve the following system of congruences:
AjrS,0 +BjrS,1 = αjrS,0 (mod φ(N)) (3.81)
CjrS,0 +DjrS,1 = αjrS,1 (mod φ(N)) (3.82)
AkrS,0 +BkrS,1 = αkrS,0 (mod φ(N)) (3.83)
CkrS,0 +DkrS,1 = αkrS,1 (mod φ(N)). (3.84)
Start by noting
Bjr
2
S,1 = Cjr
2
S,0 +DjrS,0rS,1 − AjrS,0rS,1 (mod φ(N)) (3.85)
Bkr
2
S,1 = Ckr
2
S,0 +DkrS,0rS,1 − AkrS,0rS,1 (mod φ(N)) (3.86)
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which leads to
BkCjr
2
S,0 +BkDjrS,0rS,1 −BkAjrS,0rS,1 = BjCkr2S,0 +BjDkrS,0rS,1 −BjAkrS,0rS,1
⇐⇒ BkCjrS,0 +BkDjrS,1 −BkAjrS,1 = BjCkrS,0 +BjDkrS,1 −BjAkrS,1
⇐⇒ (BkCj −BjCk) rS,0 = (BjDk +BkAj −BjAk −BkDj) rS,1
⇐⇒ rS,0 = (BjDk+BkAj−BjAk−BkDj)(BkCj−BjCk) rS,1. (3.87)
This still does not give a concrete solution to what rs,0 and rs,1 are, but when
solving the system of equations note that if {rS,0, rS,1, αj, αk} is a solution then so is
{w · rS,0, w · rS,1, αj, αk} for any w ∈ Z∗φ(N). This means that an attacker can choose any
value in Z∗φ(N) for rS,1 and then calculate rS,0 from (3.87) before ﬁnding αj and αk via
simple substitution.
3.9 Conclusion
In this chapter two collusion resistant broadcast encryption schemes taken from literature
was presented. The algorithms needed to construct the schemes were given and shown
to be correct. The assumptions from which these schemes derive their security were also
given.
We then proceeded to design our own collusion resistant broadcast encryption scheme.
Each iteration of the design was motivated and cryptanalysed and ﬁnally shown to be
insecure. Each new iteration attempted to address the security ﬂaw found in the previous
design. Each of the schemes was shown to be susceptible to some variant of the textbook
RSA attack except for the ﬁnal scheme which leaks information about the modulus.
Having designed several schemes, the ﬁnal proposed scheme will be implemented.
Although the scheme is shown to be insecure against collusion attacks, we will compare
our scheme against the two schemes taken from literature to show that our scheme does
meet the bandwidth eﬃciency requirement. We chose to implement the ﬁnal scheme as
at that time it was not known that the scheme was insecure.
The next chapter describes the software design behind implementing such broadcast
encryptions schemes as well as the framework needed to transform it into a product
entitlement system and measure the performance of the schemes.
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Framework Implementation
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we will discuss the design and implementation of a software framework
within which broadcast encryption schemes can be tested and deployed as a working
product entitlement system. Such a framework would allow for the easy deployment
and testing of newly developed broadcast encryption schemes into a product entitlement
environment. We ﬁrst list the requirements of such a framework before discussing the con-
ceptual design of the framework and ﬁnally detailing some practical problems encounters
while implementing the framework.
4.2 Requirements
In the previous chapter we detailed some proposed designs for broadcast encryption
schemes which can be used in a product entitlement system. These broadcast encryption
schemes on their own do not constitute a working product entitlement system. To this
end we build a product entitlement framework in which the broadcast encryption scheme
used can be easily changed per broadcast. This framework will encrypt and transmit
actual video content and which will be decrypted and displayed on client machines.
Because the system will have the ability to change the broadcast encryption scheme,
the network architecture of the framework will be far removed from the actual imple-
mentation of the broadcast encryption scheme. This will allow for the development of
new broadcast encryptions schemes without having to modify the existing framework to
incorporate them.
Before deploying a new broadcast encryption scheme it must ﬁrst be determined
whether the performance of the scheme allows it to be used in a broadcast environ-
ment with changing entitlement sets and storage constraints. To make these tests easier
to run a performance testing framework will be constructed that can report important
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measurements, such as key calculation time, taken from the broadcast encryption scheme.
The following list formalises the requirements of such a framework:
 The broadcast encryption scheme must be interchangeable without having to rebuild
the framework.
 The system must be able to stream video content which can be displayed on the
receiver.
 The system must provide the ability to encrypt the data before sending it across
the network.
 During the sending of a video stream the system must be able to add and remove
receivers from the entitled group without interruptions to entitled viewers.
 The only customisation required to run performance tests on new broadcast encryp-
tion schemes is the speciﬁcation of the test parameters.
Emulating the broadcast environment
In a true broadcast environment each set top box would receive the exact same broad-
casted ciphertext stream. In a software simulated environment this can be achieved by IP
multicasting or careful synchronisation of the network streams before they are encrypted.
It has been decided that implementing either of these options would bring no real beneﬁt
to the system. Instead we will use several streams that encrypt using the same session key
but have no synchronisation between them. As our implementation uses stream ciphers
this will result in several ciphertext streams that were encrypted with the same key but
diﬀering plaintexts which is entirely insecure. As this conﬁguration will only be used
during testing this does not present a problem.
4.3 Network Software Architecture
One of the requirements of the system is that the client machines should be able to decrypt
and display the video content that was broadcast by the server. Since rendering video is
not part of the design of this thesis it was instead opted to use an existing video player.
Our framework will interface with an existing video player through some network proto-
col supported by the player. This decision leads to the following framework: construct
a proxy component that intercepts the outgoing network traﬃc of the video streaming
server and encrypts it before sending it across the network. A similar proxy component
receives the encrypted data on the client side and decrypts it before sending it to the
rendering client to display the video. For the video data to be decrypted correctly these
proxy components need to agree on a key and when to start using this key. To achieve
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Figure 4.1: Software system architecture
this an additional handler component is constructed. On the client side the handler will
be responsible for calculating the content encryption key from the key information sent to
it by the server and passing that information to the proxy component. On the server side
the handler component will calculate the encryption key according to the current entitled
set and send the corresponding message header across the network unencrypted. This
message header is sent unencrypted as this is part of the design requirements for a broad-
cast encryption scheme. When these components are tied together they are essentially
simulating a conditional access client on a set-top box at the client side.
This framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The dashed boxes represent the collection
of components constructed for this thesis. Note that one pair of proxy components do
not have an encrypted stream between them and also transfers data from the receiver
to the server, something that would not happen in a real broadcast environment. These
components are included because some video rendering clients are not designed to run in
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a true broadcast environment and can therefore send some identifying information to the
video streaming server and the framework needs to pass this information along. Since this
does not occur in a real broadcast environment we do not encrypt these data. Because the
proxy component already supports redirecting of traﬃc we reuse this component without
encryption to redirect the data from the render client to the streaming server.
We have given a general overview of the network architecture and will now describe
in detail how each component works.
4.3.1 Server Handler
An important design speciﬁcation was that the video rendering should be uninterrupted
for any entitled viewer in the system. Calculating session keys might take up to several
seconds depending on the broadcast encryption scheme used. This requires that the new
session key should already be calculated by the time the encryption proxy has need of it.
The responsibility of calculating the session key falls to the server handler.
For each receiver client that connects a new server handler is created. The server han-
dler is mainly responsible for interacting with the stored broadcasting centre to generate
the session keys and message headers, and communicating these keys to the correct com-
ponents. The message header is broadcast in a diﬀerent stream from the encrypted video
data. This makes it easier to measure the bandwidth usage performance of the schemes
than if the key information would have been interwoven with the encrypted video data in
the same stream.
Once a request to modify the entitled set is given to the server handler it uses the
stored broadcast centre to generate a new set of keys. Once these keys are calculated the
server handler sends an entitlement message to the connected receiver client. It speciﬁes
the point where the new keys should be used to a user-speciﬁable number of bytes from
the current position in the stream. This delay is introduced to give the receiver client
enough time to receive the entitlement message as well as calculate the new session key.
The most recent entitlement message is also stored so that if a new client connects during
a broadcast that entitlement information can immediately be sent to them.
4.3.2 Client Handler
The client handler operates in much the same way as the server handler, but instead of
broadcasting and creating the entitlement information it receives and consumes it. The
client handler also runs in a diﬀerent thread from the encryption proxy and interfaces with
the stored receiver client to calculate the new session keys as the entitlement information
is received. If the current receiver is not in the entitled set it will still request a session key
from the stored receiver client. The key generated will not be the one needed to correctly
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decrypt the secured content and will result in the encryption proxy sending random data
to the video renderer.
4.3.3 Encryption Proxy
An encryption proxy operates on a set of streams. It reads data from one stream, encrypts
those data and then writes the encrypted data to the second stream. The data can
be encrypted by any symmetric cipher but for stream ciphers the encrypt and decrypt
operations are the same and thus the same component can be used for both operations.
Stream ciphers also have the ability to encrypt an arbitrary amount of bytes while block
ciphers have to encrypt a multiple of the block size. Since the requests to change the
session key are asynchronous to the encryption step, a request could arrive that requires
the key to be changed in the middle of a block. This problem can be averted in two
ways: use a padding scheme for the last block or synchronise the blocks with the session
key change requests. Both of these approaches require more eﬀort than using a stream
cipher for encryption and therefore stream ciphers are preferred over block ciphers for our
implementation.
4.3.4 Session Key Change Requests
If the entity running the broadcast centre decides to change the entitled set this change
must be communicated to all the clients. The handlers on each side of the connection
processes these requests. On the server side the handler requests a new session key and
a new broadcast key. This is packaged together with the entitled set S and the mark at
which the new key should be used into an entitlement message. This message is passed
to the encryption proxy as it contains all the information the encryption proxy needs to
correctly change the key.
4.3.5 Stored Broadcast Centre and Receiver Client
The broadcast centre and receiver clients are generated separately from the network frame-
work. Instead they are generated beforehand and then each instance of the receiver clients
are stored on the appropriate client machine. There are two main reasons for this:
1. generating the system parameters on a client machine is insecure and
2. the underlying broadcast scheme can be swapped out without touching the frame-
work as per the design requirements.
These stored objects must conform to the design speciﬁcations of a broadcast centre and
receiver client. More speciﬁcally, the broadcast centre must make available an Encrypt(S)
method and the receiver client an Decrypt(S, D) method. The signatures of these methods
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diﬀer from those deﬁned for a broadcast encryption scheme in Section 3.1 as they lack any
way of passing system or viewer parameters. These parameters are already instantiated
in the objects when they are stored on disk and therefore there is no need to pass them
to the methods again. This also means that each stored receiver client is irrevocably tied
to a speciﬁc viewer identity.
4.4 Testing Framework
The testing framework consists of two separate parts. The ﬁrst is used for pure perfor-
mance testing. This measures the time and space needed for the broadcast encryption
scheme to operate. The second part tests the networking code of the product entitlement
system and that it works correctly with any broadcast encryption system it is given to
use.
4.4.1 Performance Testing
The three main measurements that can be taken with a broadcast encryption scheme
is the size on disk of the various stored components, the time the scheme requires to
calculate new keys and the amount of network traﬃc needed to send message headers.
This corresponds to the resources that Fiat and Naor [16] attempt to optimise. Examining
the three methods that deﬁne a broadcast encryption scheme, from Section 3.1, we have
 Setup(λ, n)
 Encrypt(S,S)
 Decrypt(S, i,Pi, D)
and between them there are seven parameters that can be varied. But S, Pi and i depend
on the output of Setup(λ, n) and D depends on the output of Encrypt(S,S). Thus the
only parameters we are interested in varying are λ, n and S.
We are interested in measuring the total amount of storage required by the broadcast
centre and receiver clients. For the receiver clients the space needed will be averaged
over all receiver clients in the population. We are also interested in the time required to
calculate the session keys, both on the broadcast centre and on the individual receivers.
Since the testing for each broadcast encryption scheme will be the same up to setting
the boundaries of the parameters to be tested, a module was created that takes as input
the range of one of the parameters to test over, ﬁxed values for other parameters and
outputs the results in a table format. Some of the tests are reported on at the same time,
for instance measuring time taken by the Setup(λ, n) method will also report on the size
of the objects created by it.
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4.4.2 Correctness Testing
To ensure that the network architecture works correctly the receiver clients must decrypt
the content sent by the broadcasting centre when they are in the entitled set. To check
for correct decryption each receiver client is given a reference ﬁle. This is also the ﬁle
that will be broadcast and encrypted by the broadcast centre. As each client receives the
entitlement information they calculate a new key based on that information, decrypt the
incoming content with that key and check the decrypted content against the reference
ﬁle they have been given. To report if each byte is correctly or incorrectly decrypted is
unnecessary since we expect large segments of the broadcast to be continuously decrypted
correctly or incorrectly seeing as the entitled set changes with a low frequency compared
to the volume of data transferred. The assumption is made that there are no errors
during the transmission of any data and thus that any decryption errors are due to the
key being incorrect. Instead the component will only report when it goes from decrypting
correctly to incorrectly and vice versa. A certain number of bytes must be sequentially
decrypted incorrectly for the switch to be recognised. This is because a stream cipher
has a 1
256
probability of randomly correctly decrypting a byte even if an incorrect key is
used. These data can then be easily checked against the entitlement messages sent for
the broadcast to determine if the data is being decrypted correctly at the right time.
4.5 Practical Considerations
During the implementation of the frameworks described previously some implementation
issues where encountered. In this section we will discuss each of these issues and how they
were resolved.
4.5.1 Video Rendering
The choice was made to use VideoLan Client (VLC) as it provides the ability to act
as both a video streaming server and rendering client. VLC is an open source software
package and therefore the temptation exists to modify its network components to include
the encryption code of this project. After some investigation it was decided to not to do
this as it would require working with an unfamiliar codebase, an unfamiliar programming
language as well as tying the project to the VLC code making it harder to integrate in
other software packages. Instead we found after some experimentation that setting up the
VLC server to stream via HTTP and intercepting and resending that stream still allows
the VLC client to correctly render the video.
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4.5.2 Server Handling
The server handler is run in a separate thread from the encryption proxy so that the
key generation and message header broadcasting steps do not hinder data broadcasting.
Similarly the client handler is run in a separate thread from the decryption proxy. It
was mentioned that newly generated session keys only get used a user-speciﬁable number
of bytes after the entitled set has changed. For our testing purposes a 54396kb ﬁle that
contains 491 seconds of video is used. This translates into an average 111kb of data per
second of video. Measurements in Section 5.2 show that message headers are mostly less
than 1kb which will incur a negligible amount of transfer time when compared with the
bandwidth required to transfer the video content. In our testing setup the new key is
set to be used 500 000 bytes after the entitlement group request has been received. This
gives the client 500000
111·1024 w 4.4 seconds to calculate the new key. A larger buﬀer might be
needed if used in practice, but for correct synchronisation testing timely content delivery
to the client is not a concern.
4.5.3 Encryption Proxy
As requests to change the session keys happen in an asynchronous manner and the encryp-
tion proxy runs in its own thread, it has to access the requests in a thread-safe manner.
This is done by using a thread-safe queue from the standard language library. Any new
requests for session key changes is added to the back of the queue while the encryption
proxy only looks at the start of the queue. This operates under the assumption that the
requests arrive in an ordered manner. If the queue used is a doubly linked list the amount
of time each thread locks the other out from reading the object is minimal. Minimising
the time that each thread locks the object is crucial as the encryption proxy blocks until
it has peeked at the head of the queue. If it blocks for too long it will interrupt the video
rendering of the receiver.
4.5.4 Session Key Changes
The object that contains the message header also contains a ﬁeld for the session key to be
used with this message header. When the server handler constructs the message header
it stores the session key in this ﬁeld. This object is also entered into the encryption proxy
queue. The encryption proxy now knows the session key to use and at what point in the
stream to start encrypting data with it. A clone of this object is then made by the server
handler and the session key ﬁeld is cleared before being sent across the network. Having
the session key ﬁeld present in the object allows the receiver client to ﬁll in that ﬁeld with
whatever session key it calculates before being entered into the decryption proxy's queue.
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4.5.5 Correctness Testing
In order to test the correctness of the decryption routines for large viewer populations
several receiver client instances need to be run. To facilitate this we use Amazon EC2.
Amazon EC2 allows for a large number of virtual machines to be instantiated as needed.
Each of the virtual machines is loaded with an Amazon Machine Image (AMI). This
image already contains the Linux operating system and all the required libraries and
data needed to run a receiver client. When testing for large populations a broadcast
centre is ﬁrst created on a virtual machine. Once the broadcast centre has started, all
the receiver client machines are created. In order for the receiver clients to know what
the address of the broadcast centre is its IP address is passed as meta-data to all the
receiver client machines. When all the receiver clients have connected to the broadcast
centre the centre starts the broadcast and intermittently changes the entitled set. All
receiver clients monitor these changes and after the broadcast is ﬁnished checks to see if
it correctly decrypted all the content it was allowed to access. The result of this check
is stored in an Amazon DynamoDB and only machines that have reported success are
terminated. Receiver clients that experienced errors are kept online and investigated for
errors.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter the software design of a product entitlement system was discussed as well
as a framework for testing broadcast encryption schemes. We began the discussion by
listing in detail the requirements of the systems followed by a brief discussion on the
assumptions made about the broadcasting environment in which the network framework
will be tested.
The design of the framework was given and discussed. This framework has been
implemented and the implementation issues encountered were discussed. A motivation
for using Amazon EC2 for testing the correctness of the schemes over a network was also
given.
The purpose of the product entitlement system is to show that the broadcast encryp-
tion schemes can practically work and the goal of the testing framework is to measure the
performance of the broadcast encryption schemes. These performance measurements can
be used to make an informed decision on which broadcast encryption scheme is suited
to a speciﬁc product entitlement system. In the next chapter we report and discuss the
results of the performance and network tests.
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Experimental Results
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we have described a framework used to measure performance of
broadcast encryption schemes as well as using these schemes in a product entitlement
system. In this chapter we present and discuss the results from this framework when
tested on the two reference implementations mentioned in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 as well as
our own scheme presented in Section 3.8.
In addition to determining if the product entitlement system works correctly we will
be measuring the bandwidth usage, computation time and storage requirements of each
of the schemes.
A Note on Comparing Key Sizes
The two reference implementations both derive their security from elliptic curve group
assumptions while our scheme derives its security from the integer factorisation problem.
It is well known that for comparable security elliptic curve schemes require smaller key
sizes than integer factorisation based schemes. This is exempliﬁed in the partial table
taken from the NIST recommendation for key management [1], shown in Table 5.1.
Some of the tests measure results relative to the key size and to portray the result
accurately we must plot the results relative to the bits of security oﬀered by the key size
as per Table 5.1. We calculated a function to map the security parameter λ to the bits of
Bits of security (Λ) Integer ﬁeld cryptography (λ) Elliptic curve cryptography (λ)
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
Table 5.1: Equivalent security bits according to NIST SP 800-57
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Figure 5.1: The key size mapping function
security Λ. This was done by ﬁtting a polynomial function to the values found in Table 5.1.
The function that will be used to map the integer ﬁeld cryptography key sizes to the bits
of security is ∆(λ) = 2.075
√
λ + 13.6. This function is plotted against the data values
from Table 5.1 in Figure 5.1 and it can be seen that the function closely approximates the
NIST recommended key sizes. For elliptic curve cryptography the relation Λ = λ
2
is used.
5.2 Bandwidth eﬃciency
Bandwidth eﬃciency is an important design criterion for a product entitlement system
as noted in Section 3.1. If a scheme uses too much bandwidth for entitlement purposes it
becomes almost useless in a bandwidth constrained environment. While the absolute size
of the entitlement messages is a concern it is also important to note the growth rate of
the messages with respect to the input parameters, speciﬁcally the size of the entitlement
set.
Motivation
As bandwidth is a scarce resource in a broadcast environment it is important to use
it sparingly. Thus it is necessary to know how the size of the entitlement messages
are aﬀected by the various setup parameters of the schemes. Large messages will be
expensive and slow to send. Messages that are slow to transmit to all viewers will have a
detrimental eﬀect on the viewers experience since they have to wait longer to gain access
to the broadcast. The schemes' theoretical claims of O(1) messages growth with respect
to the size of S must also be veriﬁed.
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Test conﬁguration
The parameters that will be varied for these tests is the bits of security Λ, total viewer
population n and size of the entitled set |S|. For each test one parameter will ﬁrst be
varied while the other two parameters are ﬁxed and subsequently the two parameters
that inﬂuence the size of the messages will be varied. The test will set up each scheme
in turn and generate 256 entitlement messages using the supplied parameters and report
the median size of the entitlement messages as well as the standard deviation of the
measurements. The viewers in the entitled set is chosen uniformly at random each time.
Results
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 show the results of the measurements.
Discussion
The largest message header size measured was more than 1000 bytes. The maximum
size of a typical entitlement management message is 256 bytes and thus will require the
message header to be split across at least 4 entitlement management messages. This is
not ideal and very ineﬃcient. A network message created by our scheme with 80 bits of
security and 1024 total viewer population contains one 1024 bit integer and one bit vector
of length 1024. These two objects can be represented in 256 bytes, but the measurements
at this point indicate the message is almost twice this size. Investigating in more detail
the way that the network software stack used serialises the messages will shed some light
on this large increase in message size.
Both of the elliptic curve based groups have a near constant size no matter what the
size of the security parameter. As these schemes use ﬁnite ﬁelds with a size of 512 bits
regardless of the security parameter the size of the element is not aﬀected by the security
parameter. As they both also contain two elements in the message header the size of the
network messages for these schemes follow each other very closely across all measurements.
Our scheme shows slight quadratic increase in size due to the integers used that grow
quadratically with the required bits of security, as per the NIST standards. At 80 bits of
security our scheme outperforms both the elliptic curve schemes but from Figure 5.3 it is
clear that this is no longer the case when increasing the bits of security above 100.
All three schemes display a linear growth with regards to the total viewer population.
This is to be expected as the number of group elements in the message stays the same, but
the bit vector needed to represent the entitled set has to grow larger. There is a plateau
around the 500 viewer population in the growth of the network message size. The bit
vector used to represent the entitled set uses several 64-bit integers to represent the set.
The two measurements in the plateau were made at 520 and 576 viewers, respectively.
Representing 520 bits requires nine 64 bit integers, but these nine integers can also be
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Figure 5.2: Standard deviation of network message size
used to represent exactly 576 bits as well. Therefore the size of the representation does
not grow between these two measurements as no new 64 bit integers have to be added to
represent the new, larger population.
The size of the entitled set has almost no eﬀect on the size of the network message as
can clearly be seen from the zero growth exhibited by all three schemes when increasing
the size of this set and thus all schemes are bandwidth eﬃcient.
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Figure 5.3: Median of network message size across several parameters
5.3 Computation time
While bandwidth is the most constrained resource in a broadcast environment it is not
the only limited resource. The time available to the broadcast centre and the set top box
for cryptographic calculations is limited by the design requirement that the viewers enjoy
an uninterrupted broadcast. Processors are also of limited power and can only do a ﬁnite
amount of calculations in any given timespan. In this section we will investigate the time
required by each of the broadcast encryption schemes tested to execute various functions.
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5.3.1 Scheme setup times
Motivation
Before a product entitlement system can be deployed the necessary broadcast centre and
receiver clients must ﬁrst be generated. The test will only report the total time taken
to generate a broadcast centre together with its receiver clients. The time it takes to
generate each individual client is not reported as a system would only be deployed as a
whole unit due to the static way the schemes are implemented.
Test conﬁguration
The parameters that will be varied for these tests is the bits of security and total viewer
population as the size of the entitled set does not inﬂuence the setup phase of the schemes.
For each test one parameter will be varied while the other parameter stays ﬁxed. After-
wards both parameters will be varied. The test will set up 16 instances of each scheme
in turn and report on the median time and standard deviation taken to initialise the
broadcast centre with all its receiver clients.
Results
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show the results of the measurements.
Discussion
Clearly both DPP1 and BGW1 outperform our scheme with regards to the setup time
required. This is because with both DPP1 and BGW1 the clients receive only one unique
group element while the rest of the information is shared across all viewers. In contrast
to this all group elements given to a receiver in our scheme are unique to that receiver
and need to be calculated.
Increasing the bits of security for our scheme results in a quadratic increase of the
calculation time. This increase can be contributed to the size of the integers used that
must increase quadratically in size relevant to the bits of security. The calculation time
for our scheme also increases quadratically, albeit slightly slower, when increasing the
total population. The number of calculations done per receiver in our scheme is linear
in the total population as each node in a receiver's graph needs to be constructed and
calculated. When increasing the population linearly this results in a quadratic overall
increased computation time.
When compared to the setup times of DPP1 and BGW1 the near 17 minutes needed
for the setup of our scheme with around 700 receivers seems daunting, but this is a once
oﬀ costly operation. Once the scheme has been setup and deployed to set top boxes this
operation does not need to be performed again. If the total viewer population increases
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Figure 5.4: Standard deviation of scheme setup time
after a scheme has been deployed then the entire scheme will have to be set up again and
redeployed. However, since the viewers are partitioned into groups of 1024, as discussed
in Section 2.7, a new scheme with 1024 viewers can be set up to contain the new viewers.
By using this method the old schemes do not have to be redeployed in the event that the
total viewer population increases and we incur the time cost of setting up a new scheme
only once for every 1024 viewers.
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Figure 5.5: Median of scheme setup time across several parameters
5.3.2 Generating Broadcast Keys
Motivation
The centre needs to generate a fresh key for each broadcast, but more importantly it
needs to be able to generate new keys on the ﬂy as to enable new viewers to join in the
broadcast or cut oﬀ pirate viewers. If the generation of these keys are too time consuming
it will lead to a negative customer experience. This test does not take into consideration
the time it takes to broadcast the keys, only the time taken to generate them.
Test conﬁguration
The test will vary one parameter while keeping all others ﬁxed. The tests will generate
256 keys and report the median time to generate a key over these 256 attempts and
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also report the standard deviation of the measurements. The viewers in the entitled set
are chosen uniformly at random each time a key is generated. When varying the total
population the test is slightly diﬀerent for DPP1. Instead of keeping the size of the entitled
set constant the number of receivers not in the entitled set is kept constant. We know
that theoretically the number of calculations that DPP1 must do is related to the size of
the revoked set. Thus if we want to show that the size of the population has no eﬀect on
the number these calculations the size of the revoked set must be kept constant.
Results
Figure 5.6 and Figure 5.7 show the results of the measurements.
DPP1 BGW1 Our Scheme
Figure 5.6: Standard deviation of message header generation time
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(a) DPP1 (b) BGW1
(c) Our scheme
Figure 5.7: Median of message header generation time
Discussion
At 80 bits of security our scheme outperforms DPP1 and BGW1 due to the less compu-
tationally expensive multiplications it uses instead of having to add points on an elliptic
curve. This advantage quickly disappears as the size of the integers used for our scheme
increases quadratically in size relative to the number of bits of security. The time needed
for BGW1 and DPP1 to generate keys stays almost constant and ﬁnally outperforms our
scheme by a large factor.
The total population has no eﬀect on the time needed to generate a broadcast key in
any of the three schemes. This is expected as the size of the entitled set (or revoked set
in the case of DPP1) is the main contributing factor to key generation time at the centre.
Our scheme and BGW1 both have a linear growth when increasing the size of the
entitled set while DPP1 shows a slight linear decline in generation time. Again at the 80
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bits of security point our scheme requires less time per calculation than the elliptic curve
schemes and thus shows a slower growth than BGW1. The decline in the time needed by
DPP1 is due to the size of the revoked set shrinking which is the contributing factor in
the generation time of the key. The sudden drop at the end occurs because if everyone
is in the entitled set DPP1 does a less costly exponentiation with 1 instead of an integer
similar in size to the group order.
All ﬁve large standard deviation readings shown by DPP1 and BGW1 are due to a single
reading of around 350 milliseconds during the testing phase. This reading was most likely
caused by the Java virtual machine garbage collecting all the previously generated test
messages.
5.3.3 Deriving session keys
Motivation
Upon receiving a new broadcasted key each receiver needs to calculate a new session key.
This calculation has to be fast so that new viewers can access the content as early as
possible. This information will also be useful to establish how long a buﬀer should be
given before the centre switches over to the new session key.
Test conﬁguration
The test will vary one parameter while keeping all others ﬁxed. The tests will generate
one broadcasted key and report the median time taken by 16 viewers in the entitled set to
derive the session key. It will also report the standard deviation over the 16 measurements.
Because some of the operations measured can take a long time to complete only 16
measurements are taken in order to complete the test in a timely manner. The viewers
in the entitled set is chosen uniformly at random each time a key is generated. Again for
DPP1 the number of viewers not in the entitled set is kept constant when increasing the
population.
Results
Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 show the results of the measurements.
Discussion
Our scheme outgrows both DPP1 and BGW1 once again as the bits of security increases.
DPP1 shows a deﬁnite linear increase relative to the security parameter while BGW1 seems
unaﬀected. The calculations used in DPP1 to ﬁnd the coeﬃcients are done in integers
modulo the group order. Since the group order becomes larger as the bits of security
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DPP1 BGW1 Our Scheme
Figure 5.8: Standard deviation of key derivation time
increase, these calculations slow down as a larger group order results in larger integers
being used in the calculations.
The time to derive a session key with all three schemes is unaﬀected by an increase
in the total population. Here the O(
∣∣S¯∣∣2) time algorithm used by DPP1 can clearly be
seen to be slower than the calculation when compared to the O(|S|) time algorithm used
by BGW1. Our scheme was measured at fewer points for the total population. While
the operation to derive the session key itself is relatively quick, in order to make these
measurements we must ﬁrst set up a scheme with the required number of viewers. As this
setup operation can take quite long as the total population increases, no measurements
were taken at higher values for the total population.
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(a) DPP1 (b) BGW1
(c) Our scheme
Figure 5.9: Median of key derivation time across several parameters
Due to the algorithm used we see a clear quadratic growth for DPP1 in calculation
time when deriving a session key as the the size of the entitled set decreases. Our scheme
shows a linear growth while BGW1 seems to stay constant as the set increases in size, but
as can be seen form Figure 5.9b there is, in fact, a clear linear increase.
Comparison of techniques used for DPP1
Delerablée et al. propose two algorithms [12] that are used to derive the session key when
using DPP1. These two algorithms are called Aggregate and Aggregate
′. To derive a session
key a receiver ﬁrst runs Aggregate, which runs in O(
∣∣S¯∣∣2) time, and then uses the output
as input to Aggregate′, which runs in O(
∣∣S¯∣∣) time. Thus overall the time complexity of
the originally proposed method to derive session keys is the same as our partial fractions
based approach. A comparison of the time taken by both techniques to derive a session
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of time taken by diﬀerent techniques used to derive a session
key for DPP1
key is shown in Figure 5.10.
From the graph our partial fractions based method can be seen to be signiﬁcantly
faster than the originally proposed methods. Due to the signiﬁcant amount of time
used by originally proposed method to derive a session key, it cannot satisfy both the
requirements that a viewer gains quick access to a broadcast after being added to the
entitled set and that viewers already in the set enjoy an uninterrupted viewer experience
for small entitled sets. Our new technique allows for DPP1 to satisfy both requirements
and thus be used as a broadcast encryption scheme in situations where the size of the
entitled set can be very small.
5.4 Storage space required on disk
Disk storage space is readily available to conditional access clients as modern day set top
boxes can record several hours of video on disk. Due to the attack model in which the
broadcast schemes are designed it does not compromise the security of the system if the
conditional access client data are stored on unsecured hardware. But it is still a ﬁnite
resource and care must be taken to ensure the clients and broadcast centres can store all
the necessary data to operate correctly.
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5.4.1 Broadcast centres
Motivation
Broadcast centres are likely to store information about all the receiver clients in order
to be able to generate broadcast keys. This has the potential to become quite a large
amount of data.
Test conﬁguration
This test will in turn set up and then save to disk each of the broadcast centres for
each scheme. The test will then report the size of these ﬁles on disk. The median size
over 16 initialisations of a broadcast centre is reported and the standard deviation is also
indicated.
Results
Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12 show the results of the measurements.
DPP1 BGW1 Our Scheme
Figure 5.11: Standard deviation of broadcast centre storage size
Discussion
Only DPP1 exhibits a linear growth in storage space when the security parameter is
increased as it stores a single integer modulo the group order per receiver. As the group
order grows larger with the increased bits of security, so do the integers associated with
each receiver. BGW1 shows no growth relative to the bits of security since it stores points
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(a) DPP1 (b) BGW1
(c) Our scheme
Figure 5.12: Median of broadcast centre storage size across several parameters
on the elliptic curve which are always elements from a 512 bit ﬁnite ﬁeld. Our scheme
again displays a quadratic growth with respect to the security parameter which is caused
by the quadratic growth in integer sizes used.
When keeping the bits of security ﬁxed and increasing the total population all three
schemes show linear growth. Here our scheme grows faster than the two elliptic curve
based schemes. DPP1 exhibits signiﬁcantly less growth than BGW1 as DPP1 requires the
centre to store only one integer associated with each receiver while BGW1 requires storing
two points on the elliptic curve.
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5.4.2 Receiver clients
Motivation
The cost to manufacture a set top box increases with the storage space required to store
the necessary data for the broadcast encryption scheme used. It is in the interest of
any commercial operator to keep their cost to the client as low as possible. Also, if the
broadcast centre ever decided to replace all the installed receiver clients it can be beneﬁcial
to have the amount of data that have to be transferred as low as possible.
Test conﬁguration
This test will in turn set up all the receiver clients and then save 16 chosen uniformly at
random to disk. The test then reports the median size of these saved receiver clients and
the standard deviation of the measurements.
Results
Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 show the results of the measurements.
Discussion
BGW1 shows no growth when increasing the security parameter. As it only stores points
on the elliptic curve which has a 512 bit underlying ﬁeld regardless of the size of the
security parameter, this is to be expected. A quadratic growth is once again seen with
our scheme as the size of the integers used for information storage increases quadratically.
DPP1 has a linear growth with regards to the bits of security as it stores integers modulo
the group order, which grows as the bits of security increase.
All three schemes again exhibit a linear growth in storage space when increasing the
total population, but now our scheme grows faster than the two elliptic curve based groups.
Our scheme requires each receiver to store four group elements per other receiver in the
system while the other two require each receiver to store two elements. DPP1 stores one
point on the elliptic curve and one integer modulo the group size and thus grows slower
than BGW1 which stores two points on the elliptic curve.
5.5 Product Entitlement system
In the previous sections we tested the performance metrics of the broadcast encryption
schemes that have been implemented. The results from those tests provide a guideline
on being able to choose the parameters for a scheme that will be deployed commercially.
What the tests did not do was verify the correctness of the network architecture and that
the product entitlement system does work. We will conduct those tests in this section.
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DPP1 BGW1 Our Scheme
Figure 5.13: Standard deviation of receiver storage size
5.5.1 Correct Synchronisation of Decryption
Motivation
A product entitlement system would be useless if the system utilising it does not decrypt
the protected video content correctly. While our simulation assumes that all data are
transferred faultlessly, the encrypted and pseudorandom streams need to be synchronised
correctly for decryption to be successful.
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(a) DPP1 (b) BGW1
(c) Our scheme
Figure 5.14: Median of receiver storage size across several paramters
Test conﬁguration
During the broadcast the broadcast centre will change the entitled set every 60 seconds.
It will choose a random entitled set size and then random receivers to put in this set.
Each simulating receiver node is given the entire decrypted video before the start of
the test. As the encrypted video is broadcast the receiver decrypts the video content and
compares it to the unencrypted copy stored on disk, noting where the received encrypted
data were correctly decrypted. After the broadcast completes, the client compares the
received network messages to the noted correctly decrypted sections and checks if the
content was decrypted correctly only at the time the receiver was supposed to be able to
do so.
Each of the three implemented broadcast encryptions schemes will be tested. Each
test will be run with schemes that contain 1024 users, but only a small subset of all
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 97
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10
20
30
40
Clients
M
in
u
te
s
Time to transfer test ﬁle to all clients
2 ECUs
8 ECUs
Figure 5.15: Time to complete synchronisation test
receivers will be simulated.
Results
All the tests that were run completed successfully. Figure 5.15 shows the total time taken
by the server to completely transfer the test ﬁle to all connected clients.
Discussion
The framework correctly sends and decrypts the test ﬁle at the correct times, but the
server infrastructure used does not scale well. As can be seen from Figure 5.15 there is
a linear increase in the amount of time the server takes to transfer the entire ﬁle to all
clients as the number of connected clients increases beyond a certain point. The period
of negligible growth for low numbers of connected clients is due to the implementation
detail that the network test cannot complete in less than 10 minutes. This is to give the
server enough time to change the entitled set several times during the test. Increasing
the number of Elastic Compute Units (ECUs) helps to slow the growth, but for both sets
of measurements as soon as an ECU has to service more than two clients the time to
complete the test increased signiﬁcantly. To emulate a full 1024 receivers a system with
512 ECUs will have to be used, unfortunately Amazon does not oﬀer such a system. A
distributed system could be considered where intermediate servers duplicate and relay
the information from the initial server, but currently the framework is unable to relay
entitlement messages which is required to test the receivers.
The framework is therefore unable to deliver content in a timely manner to a large
amount of test clients. However, in a true broadcasting environment the server would
only generate one stream of encrypted data that is broadcast to all clients. Thus our
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framework will work in a true broadcast environment.
5.5.2 Switching of Underlying Cryptographic Schemes
Motivation
Our system was designed and constructed with the idea in mind that new broadcast
encryption schemes can be tested on it. For this reason it must work if the underlying
scheme is switched out for a diﬀerent one. This also applies to the stream cipher used for
the encryption step.
Test conﬁguration
The same approach will be taken as with the synchronisation test but at a smaller scale.
The system was not designed to switch out the underlying scheme during run time and
thus for each test the broadcast scheme and the stream cipher will be set before the test
is run. Since the total number of conﬁgurations of the broadcast encryption schemes and
stream ciphers is low enough we chose to test all the combinations. We will test all three
implemented broadcast encryption schemes in conjunction with AES in OFB mode and
RC4.
Results
All tests completed successfully.
Discussion
The test showed that our framework can successfully broadcast and decrypt content with
various combinations of cryptographic schemes. This allows the framework to switch to
newer schemes as old schemes become more insecure.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we evaluated the performance of the implemented broadcast encryption
schemes across several parameters. The results were then analysed and used to compare
the schemes. The results also validate the theoretical predictions made of the bandwidth
requirements of the schemes. The signiﬁcant reduction in computation time for DPP1
when using a technique we developed was also shown.
We also veriﬁed that the network architecture synchronises the decryption of the con-
tent correctly and adheres to the design requirement that the underlying cryptographic
schemes that are used can be changed for each broadcast. We also discussed the inability
of the network testing server to scale to a large number of clients.
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We found that BGW1 is the best scheme of the three to use as it generates and
calculates session keys much faster than DPP1. Our scheme was immediately disqualiﬁed
as a candidate because it is not secure.
In the ﬁnal chapter we present ideas for future work that can be based on the work
presented so far and also discuss the extent to which this thesis has completed the goals
set out for it.
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Conclusion
6.1 Introduction
This thesis investigated the design of a bandwidth eﬃcient and secure broadcast encryp-
tion scheme as well as a way of turning this scheme into a product entitlement system. We
laid the necessary groundwork for a reader to understand the concepts required to design
a secure broadcast encryption scheme. Broadcast encryption schemes from the literature
were also studied and two were selected for comparison against out designed scheme.
These implemented schemes were tested and evaluated. In this chapter we discuss the
extent to which the original goals for the study were met and list some opportunities for
future work based on the thesis.
6.2 Meeting of Goals
A set of speciﬁc goals were identiﬁed for this thesis in Section 1.2:
1. The design of a new bandwidth eﬃcient and secure broadcast encryption
scheme: In Chapter 3 the design of four new broadcast encryption schemes are
given. These schemes are all theoretically bandwidth eﬃcient as they require only
a single group element to be broadcasted to all receivers to entitle an arbitrary set.
However, these designs are not secure against collusion attacks. The bandwidth
eﬃciency of our scheme proposed in Section 3.8 was veriﬁed with practical measure-
ments of the size of the message header. The result of these measurements were
given in Section 5.2.
2. Develop a framework for testing and measuring performance of broadcast
encryption schemes: Chapter 4 details the software design considerations taken
into account when developing a testing framework for broadcast encryption schemes.
This framework was implemented to enable the completion of the ﬁnal goal.
100
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3. The development of a framework which can be used to turn a broadcast
encryption scheme into a product entitlement system: Most of Chapter 4
is devoted to detailing the design and implementation of such a framework. This
is a basic framework that is not quite ready for commercial deployment. Further
work can be done on this framework to make it more user-friendly, such as providing
it with a graphical user interface. In Chapter 5 this framework was also tested to
verify that it works correctly.
4. Evaluate the newly designed scheme and compare it to examples found in
the literature: The results from the testing framework were given in Chapter 5.
These were the performance results of the ﬁnal scheme we proposed as well as
the performance results of two bandwidth eﬃcient broadcast schemes found in the
literature. We discussed these results and compared the three broadcast encryption
schemes tested. An overview of the comparison is given in the next section.
6.3 Comparison to Existing Schemes
In Chapter 5 the results of a series of performance tests of our scheme and two schemes
taken from the literature were given. These results were compared and discussed. For
certain choices of parameters our scheme performed better than the two schemes from the
literature but in many cases this advantage was lost as soon as the test parameters were
increased. One major contributing factor is that our scheme derives its security from the
integer factorisation problem while the schemes taken from the literature depend on the
Diﬃe-Hellman problems on elliptic curves. This requires our scheme to use signiﬁcantly
larger integers than the schemes from literature for comparable security, resulting in larger
network messages, greater storage requirements and longer computation times.
Message Header Size
We deﬁned a scheme to be bandwidth eﬃcient if the number of keys in the message header
is independent of the size of the total population or entitled set size. All three schemes
that were implemented are bandwidth eﬃcient according to this deﬁnition as veriﬁed by
the measurements taken. There was a slight increase in message header size when the
total population is increased, but this is due the representation of the entitled set growing
larger and not the addition of more keys in the header. When the absolute sizes of the
message headers are compared all schemes have similar performance when the bits of
security is low. Our scheme exhibits a large growth if the number of bits of security is
increased while the other schemes show no growth.
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Computation Time
Our scheme is the slowest of the three when creating the broadcast centre and receiver
clients. In order to create a receiver client the schemes from the literature calculate
much of the information once and gives it to every receiver client. In our scheme there
is very little such shared information and a large set of unique information. This leads
to the expected and observed large growth in computation time for our scheme when
the total population is increased. Similar slowdown is observed in our scheme when the
bits of security is increased for all schemes. The other schemes exhibit an increase in
computation time as the population and bits of security increase, but much less so than
our scheme.
All schemes require very little time when calculating the keys to be used in the message
headers. When using a small number of bits of security our scheme is faster than the
others but again a slowdown occurs for our scheme when increasing the bits of security.
All schemes show no increase in time to calculate session keys when increasing the total
population. Our scheme and BGW1 show a similar linear increase in the time required
to calculate a session key when the size of the entitled set is increased. DPP1 shows an
increase in time required as the size of the entitled set decreases.
DPP1 shows signiﬁcant increase in time required to derive a session key from the
message header as the entitled set size decreases. The partial fractions based approach
we introduced for use in DPP1 signiﬁcantly decreased the rate of growth when compared
with the originally proposed method to derive session keys. Our scheme and BGW1 show a
slight linear increase in time required when the entitled set grows larger. When increasing
the bits of security our scheme shows a signiﬁcant increase in the time taken to derive a
session key.
Storage requirements
All schemes require each receiver client as well as the broadcast centre to store some in-
formation about all viewers in the population. This explains the observed linear growth
of the storage requirements of all schemes when increasing the total population in the sys-
tem. Our integer based scheme does require signiﬁcantly more storage when the number
of bits of security is increased, but this can be attributed to the increase of size of the
individual elements stored and not the increase in number of elements stored.
Final Recommendation
If one of the schemes tested were to be used in a product entitlement system the BGW1
scheme, detailed in Section 3.3, would be best suited. Our proposed scheme (Section 3.8)
is shown to be insecure and thus not suitable. While the BGW1 scheme and the DPP1
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scheme (Section 3.4) have similar performance characteristics, the DPP1 scheme requires
signiﬁcantly more time to derive the session key from the message header for entitled sets
containing a small number of viewers.
6.4 Future Work
The study resulted in a large body of work to which there can still be made some im-
provements.
6.4.1 Broadcast Encryption Schemes
 It seems as if the scheme presented in Section 3.7 which sums elements from Z∗N
might be secure before a viewer is made part of an entitled set. If this can be proven
to be secure a method may be found in which the ﬁnal construction can be made
secure against collusion attacks.
6.4.2 Product Entitlement Framework
 The framework for turning a broadcast encryption scheme into a product entitlement
system is still basic. The cryptographic schemes used is ﬁxed when the application
is initialised. Since broadcast encryption schemes have diﬀerent properties it can
be beneﬁcial to be able to change the broadcast encryption scheme used on a per
broadcast basis without having to restart the application.
 The server architecture used for correctness testing over a network does not perform
well when a large number of receivers are emulated. If the server architecture can
be improved then more receivers can be simultaneously emulated for tests.
 The framework does not have a very user-friendly interface. This can be addressed
by constructing a graphical user interface.
 Unless the framework is set up to relay and encrypt the content from a video stream-
ing server it cannot specify a diﬀerent stream to be broadcast. With the addition
of a graphical user interface a possible queueing system can be implemented so that
broadcasts can be taken from diﬀerent ﬁles to create a program schedule easily.
 The testing framework works as required, but some minor improvements can be
made. Currently only one scheme can be tested at a time and there is no queueing
mechanism to run tests sequentially. As some of the tests can take several hours to
complete the test might ﬁnish at a time when the testing computer is unattended.
A queueing system would ensure that no time is wasted in running the tests.
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 The framework allows for the speciﬁcation of testing parameters on a per scheme
basis, however this still requires a recompilation of the framework. This can be
avoided by allowing the user to specify the testing parameters via the command line
interface.
 The serialisation of the network messages before they are sent over the network
can be investigated for possible improvements. Currently the product entitlement
system relies heavily on Java to serialise the group elements and the containing class
for the network messages. Improvements in bandwidth eﬃciency might be made if
custom routines are created for the serialisation of the network messages that have
total control over the way the messages are represented during network transport.
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